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### plan

#### The United States Federal Government should obtain, through alternative financing, electricity from small modular reactors for military bases in the United States.

### dod adv

#### DoD bases are vulnerable to grid disruptions which destroys command infrastructure – only SMR’s can solve

Robitaille 12

(George, Department of Army Civilian, United States Army War College, “Small Modular Reactors: The Army’s Secure Source of Energy?” 21-03-2012, Strategy Research Project)

In recent years, the U.S Department of Defense (DoD) has identified a security issue at our installations related to the dependence on the civilian electrical grid. 1 The DoD depends on a steady source of electricity at military facilities to perform the functions that secure our nation. The flow of electricity into military facilities is controlled by a public grid system that is susceptible to being compromised because of the age of the infrastructure, damage from natural disasters and the potential for cyber attacks. Although most major functions at military installations employ diesel powered generators as temporary backup, the public grid may not be available to provide electricity when it is needed the most. The United States electrical infrastructure system is prone to failures and susceptible to terrorist attacks. 2 It is critical that the source of electricity for our installations is reliable and secure. In order to ensure that our military facilities possess a secure source of electricity, either the public system of electric generation and distribution is upgraded to increase its reliability as well as reducing its susceptibility to cyber attack or another source of electricity should be pursued. Although significant investments are being made to upgrade the electric grid, the current investment levels are not keeping up with the aging system. Small modular reactors (SMRs) are nuclear reactors that are about an order of magnitude smaller than traditional commercial reactor used in the United States. SMRs are capable of generating electricity and at the same time, they are not a significant contributor to global warming because of green house gas emissions. The DoD needs to look at small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs) to determine if they can provide a safe and secure source of electricity. Electrical Grid Susceptibility to Disruptions According to a recent report by the Defense Science Board, the DoD gets ninety nine percent of their electrical requirements from the civilian electric grid. 3 The electric grid, as it is currently configured and envisioned to operate for the foreseeable future, may not be reliable enough to ensure an uninterrupted flow of electricity for our critical military facilities given the influences of the aging infrastructure, its susceptibility to severe weather events, and the potential for cyber attacks. The DoD dependency on the grid is reflected in the $4.01 Billion spent on facilities energy in fiscal year 2010, the latest year which data was available. 4 The electricity used by military installations amounts to $3.76 billion. 5 As stated earlier, the DoD relies on the commercial grid to provide a secure source of energy to support the operations that ensure the security of our nation and it may not be available when we need it. The system could be taken down for extended periods of time by failure of aging components, acts of nature, or intentionally by cyber attacks. Aging Infrastructure. The U.S electric power grid is made up of independently owned power plants and transmission lines. The political and environmental resistance to building new electric generating power plants combined with the rise in consumption and aging infrastructure increases the potential for grid failure in the future. There are components in the U.S. electric grid that are over one hundred years old and some of the recent outages such as the 2006 New York blackout can be directly attributed to this out of date, aging infrastructure. 6 Many of the components of this system are at or exceeding their operational life and the general trend of the utility companies is to not replace power lines and other equipment until they fail. 7 The government led deregulation of the electric utility industry that started in the mid 1970s has contributed to a three decade long deterioration of the electric grid and an increased state of instability. Although significant investments are being made to upgrade the electric grid, the **many years of prior neglect will require a considerable amount of time and funding to bring the aging infrastructure up to date**. Furthermore, the current investment levels to upgrade the grid are not keeping up with the aging system. 8 In addition, upgrades to the digital infrastructure which were done to increase the systems efficiency and reliability, have actually made the system more susceptible to cyber attacks. 9 Because of the aging infrastructure and the impacts related to weather, the extent, as well as frequency of **failures is expected to increase in the future.** Adverse Weather. According to a 2008 grid reliability report by the Edison Electric Institute, sixty seven per cent of all power outages are related to weather. Specifically, lightning contributed six percent, while adverse weather provided thirty one percent and vegetation thirty percent (which was predominantly attributed to wind blowing vegetation into contact with utility lines) of the power outages. 10 In 1998 a falling tree limb damaged a transformer near the Bonneville Dam in Oregon, causing a cascade of related black-outs across eight western states. 11 In August of 2003 the lights went out in the biggest blackout in North America, plunging over fifty million people into darkness over eight states and two Canadian provinces. Most areas did not have power restored four or five days. In addition, drinking water had to be distributed by the National Guard when water pumping stations and/or purification processes failed. The estimated economic losses associated with this incident were about five billion dollars. Furthermore, this incident also affected the operations of twenty two nuclear plants in the United States and Canada. 12 In 2008, Hurricane Ike caused approximately seven and a half million customers to lose power in the United States from Texas to New York. 13 The electric grid suffered numerous power outages **every year** throughout the United States and the number of outages is expected to increase as the infrastructure ages without sufficient upgrades and weather-related impacts continue to become more frequent. Cyber Attacks. The civilian grid is made up of three unique electric networks which cover the East, West and Texas with approximately one hundred eighty seven thousand miles of power lines. There are several weaknesses in the electrical distribution infrastructure system that could compromise the flow of electricity to military facilities. The flow of energy in the network lines as well as the main distribution hubs has become totally dependent on computers and internet-based communications. Although the digital infrastructure makes the grid more efficient, it also makes it more susceptible to cyber attacks. Admiral Mr. Dennis C. Blair (ret.), the former Director of National Intelligence, testified before Congress that “the growing connectivity between information systems, the Internet, and other infrastructures creates opportunities for attackers to disrupt telecommunications, electrical power, energy pipelines, refineries, financial networks, and other critical infrastructures. 14 ” The Intelligence Community assesses that a number of nations already have the technical capability to conduct such attacks. 15 In the 2009 report, Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Armed Services Committee, Adm. Blair stated that “Threats to cyberspace pose one of the most serious economic and national security challenges of the 21st Century for the United States and our allies.”16 In addition, the report highlights a growing array of state and non-state actors that are targeting the U.S. critical infrastructure for the purpose of creating chaos that will subsequently produce detrimental effects on citizens, commerce, and government operations. These actors have the ability to compromise, steal, change, or completely destroy information through their detrimental activities on the internet. 17 In January 2008, US Central Intelligence Agency senior analyst Tom Donahue told a gathering of three hundred international security managers from electric, water, oil & gas, and other critical industry, that data was available from multiple regions outside the United States, which documents cyber intrusions into utilities. In at least one case (outside the U.S.), the disruption caused a power outage affecting multiple cities. Mr. Donahue did not specify who executed these attacks or why, but did state that all the intrusions were conducted via the Internet. 18 During the past twenty years, advances in computer technologies have permeated and advanced all aspects of our lives. Although the digital infrastructure is being increasingly merged with the power grid to make it more efficient and reliable, it also makes it more vulnerable to cyber attack. In October 2006, a foreign hacker invaded the Harrisburg, PA., water filtration system and planted malware. 19 In June 2008, the Hatch nuclear power plant in Georgia shut down for two days after an engineer loaded a software update for a business network that also rebooted the plant's power control system. In April 2009, The Wall Street Journal reported that cyber spies had infiltrated the U.S. electric grid and left behind software that could be used to disrupt the system. **The hackers came from China, Russia and other nations and were on a “fishing expedition” to map out the system**. 20 According to the secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano at an event on 28 October 2011, cyber–attacks have come close to compromising the country’s critical infrastructure on multiple occasions. 21 Furthermore, during FY11, the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team took action on more than one hundred thousand incident reports by releasing more than five thousand actionable cyber security alerts and information products. 22 The interdependence of modern infrastructures and digital based systems makes any cyber attacks on the U.S. electric grid potentially significant. The December 2008 report by the Commission on Cyber Security for the forty fourth Presidency states the challenge plainly: “America’s failure to protect cyberspace is one of the most urgent national security problems facing the new administration”. 23 The susceptibility of the grid to being compromised has resulted in a significant amount of resources being allocated to ensuring the systems security. Although a substantial amount of resources are dedicated to protecting the nation’s infrastructure, it may not be enough to ensure the continuous flow of electricity to our critical military facilities. SMRs as they are currently envisioned may be able to provide a secure and independent alternative source of electricity in the event that the public grid is compromised. SMRs may also provide additional DoD benefit by supporting the recent government initiatives related to energy consumption and by circumventing the adverse ramifications associated with building coal or natural gas fired power plants on the environment.

#### Those communication breakdowns go nuclear

Andres and Breetz 11

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The DOD interest in small reactors derives largely from problems with base and logistics vulnerability. Over the last few years, the Services have begun to reexamine virtually every aspect of how they generate and use energy with an eye toward cutting costs, decreasing carbon emissions, and reducing energy-related vulnerabilities. These actions have resulted in programs that have significantly reduced DOD energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions at domestic bases. Despite strong efforts, however, two critical security issues have thus far proven resistant to existing solutions: bases’ vulnerability to civilian power outages, and the need to transport large quantities of fuel via convoys through hostile territory to forward locations. Each of these is explored below. Grid Vulnerability. DOD is unable to provide its bases with electricity when the civilian electrical grid is offline for an extended period of time. Currently, domestic military installations receive 99 percent of their electricity from the civilian power grid. As explained in a recent study from the Defense Science Board: DOD’s key problem with electricity is that **critical missions, such as national strategic awareness and national command authorities, are** almost **entirely dependent on the national transmission grid** . . . [which] is fragile, vulnerable, near its capacity limit, and outside of DOD control. In most cases, neither the grid nor on-base backup power provides sufficient reliability to ensure continuity of critical national priority functions and oversight of strategic missions in the face of a long term (several months) outage.7 The grid’s fragility was demonstrated during the 2003 Northeast blackout in which 50 million people in the United States and Canada lost power, some for up to a week, when one Ohio utility failed to properly trim trees. The blackout created cascading disruptions in sewage systems, gas station pumping, cellular communications, border check systems, and so forth, and demonstrated the interdependence of modern infrastructural systems.8 More recently, awareness has been growing that the grid is also vulnerable to purposive attacks. A report sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security suggests that a coordinated cyberattack on the grid could result in a third of the country losing power for a period of weeks or months.9 Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure are not well understood. It is not clear, for instance, whether existing terrorist groups might be able to develop the capability to conduct this type of attack. It is likely, however, that some nation-states either have or are working on developing the ability to take down the U.S. grid. In the event of a war with one of these states, it is possible, if not likely, that parts of the civilian grid would cease to function, taking with them military bases located in affected regions. Government and private organizations are currently working to secure the grid against attacks; however, it is not clear that they will be successful. Most military bases currently have backup power that allows them to function for a period of hours or, at most, a few days on their own. If power were not restored after this amount of time, the results could be disastrous. First, military assets taken offline by the crisis would not be available to help with disaster relief. Second, **during an extended blackout, global military operations could be seriously compromised; this disruption would be particularly serious if the blackout was induced during major combat operations**. During the Cold War, this type of event was far less likely because the United States and Soviet Union shared the common understanding that **blinding an opponent with a grid blackout** **could escalate to nuclear war**. America’s current **opponents**, however, **may not share this fear or be deterred by this possibility**. In 2008, the Defense Science Board stressed that DOD should mitigate the electrical grid’s vulnerabilities by turning military installations into “**islands**” of energy self-sufficiency. The department has made efforts to do so by promoting efficiency programs that lower power consumption on bases and by constructing renewable power generation facilities on selected bases. **Unfortunately, these programs will not come close to reaching the goal of islanding the vast majority of bases**. Even with massive investment in efficiency and renewables, most bases would not be able to function for more than a few days after the civilian grid went offline Unlike other alternative sources of energy, **small reactors have the potential to solve DOD’s vulnerability to grid outages**. Most bases have relatively light power demands when compared to civilian towns or cities. Small reactors could easily support bases’ power demands separate from the civilian grid during crises. In some cases, the reactors could be designed to produce enough power not only to supply the base, but also to provide critical services in surrounding towns during long-term outages. Strategically, islanding bases with small reactors has another benefit. One of the main reasons an enemy might be willing to risk reprisals by taking down the U.S. grid during a period of military hostilities would be to affect ongoing military operations. Without the lifeline of intelligence, communication, and logistics provided by U.S. domestic bases, American military operations would be compromised in almost any conceivable contingency. Making bases more resilient to civilian power outages would reduce the incentive for an opponent to attack the grid. An opponent might still attempt to take down the grid for the sake of disrupting civilian systems, but the powerful incentive to do so in order to win an ongoing battle or war would be greatly reduced.

#### Grid failure shuts down US military operations

Paul Stockton 11, assistant secretary of defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, “Ten Years After 9/11: Challenges for the Decade to Come”, <http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=7.2.11>

The cyber threat to the DIB is only part of a much larger challenge to DoD. Potential adversaries are seeking asymmetric means to cripple our force projection, warfighting, and sustainment capabilities, by targeting the critical civilian and defense supporting assets (within the United States and abroad) on which our forces depend. This challenge is not limited to man-made threats; DoD must also execute its mission-essential functions in the face of disruptions caused by naturally occurring hazards.20 Threats and hazards to DoD mission execution include incidents such as earthquakes, naturally occurring pandemics, solar weather events, and industrial accidents, as well as kinetic or virtual attacks by state or non-state actors. Threats can also emanate from insiders with ties to foreign counterintelligence organizations, homegrown terrorists, or individuals with a malicious agenda. From a DoD perspective, this global convergence of unprecedented threats and hazards, and vulnerabilities and consequences, is a particularly problematic reality of the post-Cold War world. Successfully deploying and sustaining our military forces are increasingly a function of interdependent supply chains and privately owned infrastructure within the United States and abroad, including transportation networks, cyber systems, commercial corridors, communications pathways, and energy grids. This infrastructure largely falls outside DoD direct control. Adversary actions to destroy, disrupt, or manipulate this highly vulnerable homeland- and foreign-based infrastructure may be relatively easy to achieve and extremely tough to counter. Attacking such “soft,” diffuse infrastructure systems could significantly affect our military forces globally – potentially blinding them, neutering their command and control, degrading their mobility, and isolating them from their principal sources of logistics support. The Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) under Mission Assurance seeks to improve execution of DoD assigned missions to make them more resilient. This is accomplished through the assessment of the supporting commercial infrastructure relied upon by key nodes during execution. By building resilience into the system and ensuring this support is well maintained, DoD aims to ensure it can "take a punch as well as deliver one."21 It also provides the department the means to prioritize investments across all DoD components and assigned missions to the most critical issues faced by the department through the use of risk decision packages (RDP).22 The commercial power supply on which DoD depends exemplifies both the novel challenges we face and the great progress we are making with other federal agencies and the private sector. Today’s commercial electric power grid has a great deal of resilience against the sort of disruptive events that have traditionally been factored into the grid’s design. Yet, the grid will increasingly confront threats beyond that traditional design basis. This complex risk environment includes: disruptive or deliberate attacks, either physical or cyber in nature; severe natural hazards such as geomagnetic storms and natural disasters with cascading regional and national impacts (as in NLE 11); long supply chain lead times for key replacement electric power equipment; transition to automated control systems and other smart grid technologies without robust security; and more frequent interruptions in fuel supplies to electricity-generating plants. These risks are magnified by globalization, urbanization, and the highly interconnected nature of people, economies, information, and infrastructure systems. The department is highly dependent on commercial power grids and energy sources. As the largest consumer of energy in the United States, DoD is dependent on commercial electricity sources outside its ownership and control for secure, uninterrupted power to support critical missions. In fact, approximately 99 percent of the electricity consumed by DoD facilities originates offsite, while approximately 85 percent of critical electricity infrastructure itself is commercially owned. This situation only underscores the importance of our partnership with DHS and its work to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure – a mission that serves not only the national defense but also the larger national purpose of sustaining our economic health and competitiveness. DoD has traditionally assumed that the commercial grid will be subject only to infrequent, weather-related, and short-term disruptions, and that available backup power is sufficient to meet critical mission needs. As noted in the February 2008 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, “In most cases, neither the grid nor on-base backup power provides sufficient reliability to ensure continuity of critical national priority functions and oversight of strategic missions in the face of a long term (several months) outage.”23 Similarly, a 2009 GAO Report on Actions Needed to Improve the Identification and Management of Electrical Power Risks and Vulnerabilities to DoD Critical Assets stated that DoD mission-critical assets rely primarily on commercial electric power and are vulnerable to disruptions in electric power supplies.24 Moreover, these vulnerabilities may cascade into other critical infrastructure that uses the grid – communications, water, transportation, and pipelines – that, in turn, is needed for the normal operation of the grid, as well as its quick recovery in emergency situations. To remedy this situation, the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force recommended that DoD take a broad-based approach, including a focused analysis of critical functions and supporting assets, a more realistic assessment of electricity outage cause and duration, and an integrated approach to risk management that includes greater efficiency, renewable resources, distributed generation, and increased reliability. DoD Mission Assurance is designed to carry forward the DSB recommendations. Yet, for a variety of reasons – technical, financial, regulatory, and legal – DoD has limited ability to manage electrical power demand and supply on its installations. As noted above, DHS is the lead agency for critical infrastructure protection by law and pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7. The Department of Energy (DOE) is the lead agency on energy matters. And within DoD, energy and energy security roles and responsibilities are distributed and shared, with different entities managing security against physical, nuclear, and cyber threats; cost and regulatory compliance; and the response to natural disasters. And of course, production and delivery of electric power to most DoD installations are controlled by commercial entities that are regulated by state and local utility commissions. The resulting paradox: DoD is dependent on a commercial power system over which it does not – and never will – exercise control.

#### Nuclear war

Frederick Kagan and Michael O’Hanlon 7, Fred’s a resident scholar at AEI, Michael is a senior fellow in foreign policy at Brookings, “The Case for Larger Ground Forces”, April, <http://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424_Kagan20070424.pdf>

We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to erupt in many places where the current relative calm is tenuous. To view this as a strategic military challenge for the United States is not to espouse a specific theory of America’s role in the world or a certain political philosophy. Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view of American foreign policy makers since World War II that overseas threats must be countered before they can directly threaten this country’s shores, that the basic stability of the international system is essential to American peace and prosperity, and that no country besides the United States is in a position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order. Let us highlight the threats and their consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing those that involve key strategic regions of the world such as the Persian Gulf and East Asia, or key potential threats to American security, such as the spread of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the global Al Qaeda/jihadist movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of international demands to halt its efforts at enriching uranium and submit to international inspections. What will happen if the US—or Israeli—government becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? North Korea, of course, has already done so, and the ripple effects are beginning to spread. Japan’s recent election to supreme power of a leader who has promised to rewrite that country’s constitution to support increased armed forces—and, possibly, even nuclear weapons— may well alter the delicate balance of fear in Northeast Asia fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now, SinoTaiwanese tensions continue to flare, as do tensions between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the United States, and so on. Meanwhile, the world’s nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe to America’s Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism, yet with no serious international forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. What would happen if the key Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lost—but the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. The only serious response to this international environment is to develop armed forces capable of protecting America’s vital interests throughout this dangerous time. Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions—including not only deterrence of great power conflict in dealing with potential hotspots in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re-learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnel intensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large-scale missions for a while. But preparing for the possibility, while doing whatever we can at this late hour to relieve the pressure on our soldiers and Marines in ongoing operations, is prudent. At worst, the only potential downside to a major program to strengthen the military is the possibility of spending a bit too much money. Recent history shows no link between having a larger military and its overuse; indeed, Ronald Reagan’s time in office was characterized by higher defense budgets and yet much less use of the military, an outcome for which we can hope in the coming years, but hardly guarantee. While the authors disagree between ourselves about proper increases in the size and cost of the military (with O’Hanlon preferring to hold defense to roughly 4 percent of GDP and seeing ground forces increase by a total of perhaps 100,000, and Kagan willing to devote at least 5 percent of GDP to defense as in the Reagan years and increase the Army by at least 250,000), we agree on the need to start expanding ground force capabilities by at least 25,000 a year immediately. Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.

#### States will inevitably compete for relative status – only primacy can prevent conflict

**Wohlforth 9**, Professor of government at Dartmouth, (William, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War” World Politics, 61:1, January, Project Muse)

Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. 6 Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is.

Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.7 “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.”8 While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend to be zero sum.9

I begin by describing the puzzles facing predominant theories that status competition might solve. Building on recent research on social identity and status seeking, I then show that under certain conditions the ways decision makers identify with the states they represent may prompt them to frame issues as positional disputes over status in a social hierarchy. I develop hypotheses that tailor this scholarship to the domain of great power politics, showing how the probability of status competition is likely to be linked to polarity. The rest of the article investigates whether there is sufficient evidence for these hypotheses to warrant further refinement and testing. I pursue this in three ways: by showing that the theory advanced here is consistent with what we know about large-scale patterns of great power conflict through history; by [End Page 30] demonstrating that the causal mechanisms it identifies did drive relatively secure major powers to military conflict in the past (and therefore that they might do so again if the world were bipolar or multipolar); and by showing that observable evidence concerning the major powers’ identity politics and grand strategies under unipolarity are consistent with the theory’s expectations.

Puzzles of Power and War

Recent research on the connection between the distribution of capabilities and war has concentrated on a hypothesis long central to systemic theories of power transition or hegemonic stability: that major war arises out of a power shift in favor of a rising state dissatisfied with a status quo defended by a declining satisfied state.10 Though they have garnered substantial empirical support, these theories have yet to solve two intertwined empirical and theoretical puzzles—each of which might be explained by positional concerns for status.

First, if the material costs and benefits of a given status quo are what matters, why would a state be dissatisfied with the very status quo that had abetted its rise? The rise of China today naturally prompts this question, but it is hardly a novel situation. Most of the best known and most consequential power transitions in history featured rising challengers that were prospering mightily under the status quo. In case after case, historians argue that these revisionist powers sought recognition and standing rather than specific alterations to the existing rules and practices that constituted the order of the day.

In each paradigmatic case of hegemonic war, the claims of the rising power are hard to reduce to instrumental adjustment of the status quo. In R. Ned Lebow’s reading, for example, Thucydides’ account tells us that the rise of Athens posed unacceptable threats not to the security or welfare of Sparta but rather to its identity as leader of the Greek world, which was an important cause of the Spartan assembly’s vote for war.11 The issues that inspired Louis XIV’s and Napoleon’s dissatisfaction with the status quo were many and varied, but most accounts accord [End Page 31] independent importance to the drive for a position of unparalleled primacy. In these and other hegemonic struggles among leading states in post-Westphalian Europe, the rising challenger’s dissatisfaction is often difficult to connect to the material costs and benefits of the status quo, and much contemporary evidence revolves around issues of recognition and status.12

Wilhemine Germany is a fateful case in point. As Paul Kennedy has argued, underlying material trends as of 1914 were set to propel Germany’s continued rise indefinitely, so long as Europe remained at peace.13 Yet Germany chafed under the very status quo that abetted this rise and its elite focused resentment on its chief trading partner—the great power that presented the least plausible threat to its security: Great Britain. At fantastic cost, it built a battleship fleet with no plausible strategic purpose other than to stake a claim on global power status.14 Recent historical studies present strong evidence that, far from fearing attacks from Russia and France, German leaders sought to provoke them, knowing that this would lead to a long, expensive, and sanguinary war that Britain was certain to join.15 And of all the motivations swirling round these momentous decisions, no serious historical account fails to register German leaders’ oft-expressed yearning for “a place in the sun.”

The second puzzle is bargaining failure. Hegemonic theories tend to model war as a conflict over the status quo without specifying precisely what the status quo is and what flows of benefits it provides to states.16 Scholars generally follow Robert Gilpin in positing that the underlying issue concerns a “desire to redraft the rules by which relations among nations work,” “the nature and governance of the system,” and “the distribution of territory among the states in the system.”17 If these are the [End Page 32] issues at stake, then systemic theories of hegemonic war and power transition confront the puzzle brought to the fore in a seminal article by James Fearon: what prevents states from striking a bargain that avoids the costs of war? 18 Why can’t states renegotiate the international order as underlying capabilities distributions shift their relative bargaining power?

Fearon proposed that one answer consistent with strict rational choice assumptions is that such bargains are infeasible when the issue at stake is indivisible and cannot readily be portioned out to each side. Most aspects of a given international order are readily divisible, however, and, as Fearon stressed, “both the intrinsic complexity and richness of most matters over which states negotiate and the availability of linkages and side-payments suggest that intermediate bargains typically will exist.”19 Thus, most scholars have assumed that the indivisibility problem is trivial, focusing on two other rational choice explanations for bargaining failure: uncertainty and the commitment problem.20 In the view of many scholars, it is these problems, rather than indivisibility, that likely explain leaders’ inability to avail themselves of such intermediate bargains.

Yet recent research inspired by constructivism shows how issues that are physically divisible can become socially indivisible, depending on how they relate to the identities of decision makers.21 Once issues surrounding the status quo are framed in positional terms as bearing on the disputants’ relative standing, then, to the extent that they value their standing itself, they may be unwilling to pursue intermediate bargaining solutions. Once linked to status, easily divisible issues that theoretically provide opportunities for linkages and side payments of various sorts may themselves be seen as indivisible and thus unavailable as avenues for possible intermediate bargains.

The historical record surrounding major wars is rich with evidence suggesting that positional concerns over status frustrate bargaining: expensive, protracted conflict over what appear to be minor issues; a propensity on the part of decision makers to frame issues in terms of relative rank even when doing so makes bargaining harder; decision-makers’ [End Page 33] inability to accept feasible divisions of the matter in dispute even when failing to do so imposes high costs; demands on the part of states for observable evidence to confirm their estimate of an improved position in the hierarchy; the inability of private bargains to resolve issues; a frequently observed compulsion for the public attainment of concessions from a higher ranked state; and stubborn resistance on the part of states to which such demands are addressed even when acquiescence entails limited material cost.

The literature on bargaining failure in the context of power shifts remains inconclusive, and it is premature to take any empirical pattern as necessarily probative. Indeed, Robert Powell has recently proposed that indivisibility is not a rationalistic explanation for war after all: fully rational leaders with perfect information should prefer to settle a dispute over an indivisible issue by resorting to a lottery rather than a war certain to destroy some of the goods in dispute. What might prevent such bargaining solutions is not indivisibility itself, he argues, but rather the parties’ inability to commit to abide by any agreement in the future if they expect their relative capabilities to continue to shift.22 This is the credible commitment problem to which many theorists are now turning their attention. But how it relates to the information problem that until recently dominated the formal literature remains to be seen.23

The larger point is that positional concerns for status may help account for the puzzle of bargaining failure. In the rational choice bargaining literature, war is puzzling because it destroys some of the benefits or flows of benefits in dispute between the bargainers, who would be better off dividing the spoils without war. Yet what happens to these models if what matters for states is less the flows of material benefits themselves than their implications for relative status? The salience of this question depends on the relative importance of positional concern for status among states.

Do Great Powers Care about Status?

Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By that assumption, once a state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.25 People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity.

#### SMR’s “island” bases by providing constant reliable power

King 11

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Having a reliable source of electricity is critically important for many DoD installations. Fort Meade, Maryland, which hosts the National Security Agency’s power intensive computers, is an example of where electricity is mission critical. Installations need to be more robust against interruptions caused by natural forces or intentional attack. Most installations currently rely on the commercial electricity grid and backup generators. Reliance on generators presents some limitations. A building dedicated generator only provides electricity to a specific building when there is a power outage. Typically, diesel standby generators have an availability of 85 percent when operated for more than 24 hours [38]. Most DoD installations keep less than a 5-day supply of fuel. Small nuclear power plants could contribute to electrical energy surety and survivability. Having nuclear power plants networked with the grid and other backup generating systems 5 could give DoD installations higher power availability during extended utility power outages and more days of utility-independent operation. Existing large commercial nuclear power plants have an availability of over 90 percent. When a small nuclear power plant is networked with existing backup generating systems and the grid, overall availability values could be as high as 99.6 percent [39]. Since proposed small reactors have long refueling intervals (from 4 to 30 years), if power from the commercial grid became unavailable, a small reactor could provide years of electrical power independent of the commercial grid [4]. Power assurance to DoD installations also involves three infrastructure aspects of electricity delivery: electrical power transmission, electricity distribution, and electricity control (of distribution and transmission). Electric power transmission is the bulk transfer of electrical energy from generating plants to substations located near population centers. Electricity distribution networks carry electricity from the substations to consumers. Electricity control is the management of switches and connections to control the flow of electricity through transmission and distribution networks. Typically, transmission lines transfer electricity at high voltages over long distances to minimize loss; electricity distribution systems carry medium voltages. For electrical power transmission, very little additional infrastructure is required to incorporate small nuclear power plants because they would be located on or near the DoD installation being serviced. However, redundancy in transmission lines would make the overall network more robust. Electricity control capabilities, such as self-healing 6 and optimization of assets to increase operational efficiency, could improve overall power availability; however, they are not necessary for the integration of small nuclear power plants. Key components for improving electricity control include advanced electricity meters and electricity meter data management. These tools are needed in order to establish islanding, a condition in which a portion of the utility system, which contains both load and generation, is isolated from the remainder of the utility system and continues to operate. Since the power generation capacities of small nuclear power plants are larger than required for most DoD bases, islanding could extend to adjacent communities if sufficient technical upgrades were performed to systems outside of the installation. This contributes to DoD missions because civilians and service members working on the installation often live with their families in adjacent communities. The power would ensure that critical services such as emergency response, waste water treatment, and hospitals could be maintained.

#### DoD bypasses regulatory hurdles and safety hazards

Loudermilk 11

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Path forward: Department of Defense as first-mover Problematically, despite the immense energy security benefits that would accompany the wide-scale adoption of small modular reactors in the US, with a difficult regulatory environment, anti-nuclear lobbying groups, skeptical public opinion, and of course the recent Fukushima accident, the nuclear industry faces a tough road in the battle for new reactors. While President Obama and Energy Secretary Chu have demonstrated support for nuclear advancement on the SMR front, progress will prove difficult. However, a potential route exists by which small reactors may more easily become a reality: the US military. The US Navy has successfully managed, without accident, over 500 small reactors on-board its ships and submarines throughout 50 years of nuclear operations. At the same time, serious concern exists, highlighted by the Defense Science Board Task Force in 2008, that US military bases are tied to, and almost entirely dependent upon, the fragile civilian electrical grid for 99% of its electricity consumption. To protect military bases’ power supplies and the nation’s military assets housed on these domestic installations, the Board recommended a strategy of “islanding” the energy supplies for military installations, thus ensuring their security and availability in a crisis or conflict that disrupts the nation’s grid or energy supplies. DOD has sought to achieve this through decreased energy consumption and renewable technologies placed on bases, but these endeavors will not go nearly far enough in achieving the department’s objectives. However, by placing small reactors on domestic US military bases, DOD could solve its own energy security quandary—providing assured supplies of secure and constant energy both to bases and possibly the surrounding civilian areas as well. Concerns over reactor safety and security are alleviated by the security already present on installations and the military’s long history of successfully operating nuclear reactors without incident. Unlike reactors on-board ships, small reactors housed on domestic bases would undoubtedly be subject to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulation and certification, however, with strong military backing, adoption of the reactors may prove significantly easier than would otherwise be possible. Additionally, as the reactors become integrated on military facilities, general fears over the use and expansion of nuclear power will ease, creating inroads for widespread adoption of the technology at the private utility level. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, action by DOD as a “first mover” on small reactor technology will preserve America’s badly struggling and nearly extinct nuclear energy industry. The US possesses a wealth of knowledge and technological expertise on SMRs and has an opportunity to take a leading role in its adoption worldwide. With the domestic nuclear industry largely dormant for three decades, the US is at risk of losing its position as the global leader in the international nuclear energy market. If the current trend continues, the US will reach a point in the future where it is forced to import nuclear technologies from other countries—a point echoed by Secretary Chu in his push for nuclear power expansion. Action by the military to install reactors on domestic bases will guarantee the short-term survival of the US nuclear industry and will work to solidify long-term support for nuclear energy. Conclusions In the end, small modular reactors present a viable path forward for both the expansion of nuclear power in the US and also for enhanced US energy security. Offering highly safe, secure, and proliferation-resistant designs, SMRs have the potential to bring carbon-free baseload distributed power across the United States. Small reactors measure up with, and even exceed, large nuclear reactors on questions of safety and possibly on the financial (cost) front as well. SMRs carry many of the benefits of both large-scale nuclear energy generation and renewable energy technologies. At the same time, they can reduce US dependence on fossil fuels for electricity production—moving the US ahead on carbon dioxide and GHG reduction goals and setting a global example. While domestic hurdles within the nuclear regulatory environment domestically have proven nearly impossible to overcome since Three Mile Island, military adoption of small reactors on its bases would provide energy security for the nation’s military forces and may create the inroads necessary to advance the technology broadly and eventually lead to their wide-scale adoption.

### prolif adv

#### Massive expansion of nuclear power’s inevitable worldwide – that causes cascading prolif

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Nuclear energy is a twentieth-century innovation but until recently has not spread beyond a relatively small number 0F industrialized nations (see maps on pages 4 5). All this is about to change. With global electricity demand increasing dramatically, greenhouse gas emissions, and energy security becoming national priorities, developed and developing countries alike are reexamining nuclear energy as a means of providing a reliable E scalable source of low-carbon power. The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that global electricity demand will increase 2.2 percent a year to 2035, with about 80 percent of that growth occurring in emerging economies outside the Organization for Economic Cooperation £ Development (OECD).' Even if new policy initiatives are introduced to lower carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions Q combat global climate change, global energy-related CO2 emissions are expected to increase 21 percent between 2008 2035.1 Emerging market economies account For all of this projected increase in emissions. In the face of rising prices and increasing volatility in the oil market, many of these economies have shifted their attention to nuclear energy as a means of reducing dependence on oil (often a major source of their power generation), improving their balance of payments, and bolstering national energy security.’ Currently, 440 reactors with a total capacity of 375 gigawatts (G\Wc) arc in operation worlclwicle.\* As of March 2011, 65 nuclear reactor units, with a total capacity of 63 G\Ve, are under construction.5 As of April 2011, 158 projects are also on order or planned and 326 proposed." These preparations For replacing or expanding reactor ﬂeets Q For new entries to the marketplace follow a decades-long lull in construction suggest a “nuclear renaissance” has begun. \Y/hile “renaissance” implies a revival or return to a better time. the global expansion of nuclear energy in the coming decades will differ in several resects from the way civilian nuclear power developed between the late 1950s mid-19805. First, the scope and pace of this new deployment could be signiﬁcantly larger than in previous periods of expansion: some recent analyses put installed nuclear capacity up at 550—850 G\Ve by 2035. depending on assumptions about the implementation of low-carbon energy policiesf In IEA projections, a 50 per- cent cut in energy-related CO, emissions by 2050 would require global capacity to reach 1,200 G\Ve, a net addition of 30 G\Ve each year over the next forty years.“ To put this ﬁgure into perspective, during the period of nuclear p0wer’s most rapid expansion (1981-90). capacity increased by only 20 G\Ve a year, slowing to an annual average of 4 G\X/e from 1991 to 2006." To achieve large- scale reductions in energy—related CO: emissions, nuclear capacity must there- lore grow not only faster but also For several decades longer than during nuclear energy's previous “golden age." (As the preface indicates, safety concerns arising in the aftermath ofthe Fukushima accident will slow or scale back nuclear power expansion globally in the short term. At the same time, the longer-term impact of Fukushima on global nuclear power expansion will be less adverse, especially in emerging market countries.) Also different today is the number of countries seeking to build their ﬁrst nuclear power reactor. Some sixty-ﬁve countries have expressed interest in or are actively planning for nuclear power."' As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) points out, however, most of these countries are merely “con- sidering” the range of issues involved in nuclear power development. Many of them cannot realistically afford the large costs associated with civilian nuclear power programs. According to some analyses, countries with a GDP ofless than $50 billion could not spend several billion dollars building a reactor." ln addi- tion, many aspirant countries still lack the electricity grids required For nuclear power: electricity systems with a capacity below l0 G\Ve are unlikely to be able to accommodate a nuclear reactor.“ Some countries could address this issue by expanding electricity interconnections with neighboring states or developing ower export arrangements; however, these alternatives are not widely available in any case would take time to implement. At the same time, a number of countries have credible plans to become new nuclear energy states (NNES). The IAEA has indicated that ten to twenty-ﬁve countries might begin operating their ﬁrst plants by 2030, whereas since Cher- nobyl only thrce—China, Mexico, Romania—havc brought nuclear plants online for the ﬁrst time.” The following list shows the stages of progress of eleven emerging market countries in their ellorts to develop a civilian nuclear energy programz“ —Power reactors under construction: Iran.“ —Contracts signed, legal regulatory infrastructure well developed: United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey. —Committed plans, legal Q regulatory infrastructure developing: Vietnam, jordan. —\Well-developed plans but commitment pending: Thailand. Indonesia. Egypt, Kazakhstan. —Developing plans: Saudi Arabia, Malaysia. Emerging market nations entertaining the construction of new nuclear power capacity lace several critical issues. Domestically, each must establish strong institutions and viable regulatory frameworks addressing health, safety, prolif- eration, environmental concerns while ensuring that adequate human ﬁnancial resources are available for these tasks. Even if a state is willing to buy a nuclear reactor on a “turnkey” basis (paying For an outside operator to build Q run the system), it must still train its own nationals in these various respects Q establish a strong academic industrial culture in all aspects of commercial nuclear operations in order to achieve a sound, sustainable program. The NNES will need to build these capabilities in a sufficient timely manner. New States One of the biggest challenges in any expansion of the civilian nuclear sector is that of maintaining and strengthening the global regime for nuclear proliferation. The changing geopolitical J security environment, combined with the political instability of many regions countries that aspire to develop civilian nuclear reactor technology, has already raised proliferation concerns. Nuclear power reactors could become attractive targets for terrorists, who might also seek access to ﬁssile material for radiological dispersal devices (“dirty bombs”) or for nuclear weapons. With such materials more widely available, the proliferation risks could mount. As commercial enrichment and recycling programs multiply, countries may be tempted also to develop latent nuclear weapons capabilities, especially if they aspire to attain regional predominance, international standing, or the capabilities of regional rivals. An expansion of nuclear energy could further tax an already stressed proliferation regime. In light ofArticle IV of the Nuclear Treaty (NPT), wl1icl1 states that the treat shall not aﬁect the “inalienable right . . . to develop research, production duse of nuclear energy For peaceful purposes without discrimination . . . the right to partici ate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials H scientiﬁc ii technological information For the peaceful uses olinuclear energy, ” some nations are considering acquisition of fuel cycle capabilities as a way to avoid further dependence on foreign suppliers when they develop nuclear power.“ The NPT contains no provisions to restrict acquisition of such capabilities, although members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (a voluntary group of nations that restricts nuclear exports) have long practiced restraint on technology transfers of sensitive components of the Fuel cycle. A sharp increase in the demand for nuclear fuel could enhance the commercial attractiveness of uranium enrichment reprocessing, enticing new entrants into the market." Nations with large uranium resources might seek to add value to their uranium exports by moving further up the chain of produc- tion or by expanding current capabilities (Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, South Africa have all discussed this option recently). Even if the high cost of Fuel cycle activities proves to be a disincentive to their development, the NNES— especially in emerging markets—may consider Fuel supply security exercis- ing sovereign rights under Article IV of the NPT more relevant than economic drivers in their decisions about enrichment or reprocessing.“ With governments playing an increasing role in securing and meeting nuclear contracts, political motivations might also enter into assessments of the nuclear capabilities neces- sary for recipient countries. The great danger in the race to build out new capacity is that some new players may not take proliferation concerns as seriously as existing service providers. To address these issues, there has been a reinvigorated discussion of multilat- eral nuclear approaches (MN/\s). M NAs establish a framework to safeguard Arti- cle IV rights, speciﬁcally by limiting the diffusion ofsensitive nuclear materials E technologies while concurrently guaranteeing long-term supply of nuclear fuel to civilian nuclear power programs. Some steps in this direction include two recently approved fuel banks: the Russian-backed lnternational Uranium Enrich- ment Center in Angarsk the ME/\ Nuclear Threat Initiative Fuel Bank.” The institutional challenges to the regime are compounded both by the actions of rogue states such as Iran’s clandestine nuclear program and North Korea’s nuclear weapons testing Q new uranium enrichment pro- gram, Q by non-state activities such as the operations ofblack market nuclear networks arranged by Pakistani scientist A. Khan. Conﬁdence in the regime’s ability to respond to resolve proliferation threats has thus fallen. New technologies may put further stress on the system. Particularly worrying are the expansion of centrifuge technology, commercialization of the laser enrichment process, development and deployment of next-generation reprocessing techniques that require advanced safeguards, and the potential spread of fast reactors. Although the impact of these dynamics is tlifﬁcult to foresee, the proliferation regime needs to keep pace with the rapidly changing, complex nuclear market, especially those developments activities that facilitate the expansion of uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing. This is a major challenge for a regime already under stress.

#### The spread of enrichment and reprocessing collapse the entire nonproliferation regime

Anatoly S. Diyakov 10, Professor of Physics and Director of the Center for Arms Control Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics, “The nuclear “renaissance” & preventing the spread of enrichment & reprocessing technologies: a Russian view”, Dædalus Winter 2010

The anticipated growth of nuclear power around the world may lead to the spread of nuclear fuel cycle technologies as well. The expectations associated with a renewed interest in nuclear power and the rate of nuclear power growth in the world may be exaggerated; at the very least we can expect that the growth would occur not immediately, but over a long period. Nevertheless, there are definite concerns about the implications of nuclear power expansion for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Driving these concerns is a sense that, beyond interest in nuclear power, developing countries also have an interest in retaining their right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (npt) to possess nuclear fuel cycle technologies. A potential spread of nuclear fuel cycle technologies, especially technologies for uranium enrichment and for reprocessing spent fuel to separate plutonium, poses a serious concern to the nuclear nonproliferation regime because enrichment and reprocessing capabilities give states the capability to produce fissile materials for weapons. This is not a new problem. Indeed, as early as 1946, the Acheson-Lillenthal report declared that proliferation risks are inherent to the nuclear fuel cycle. If nations engage in fuel cycle activities it increases the risk of: • Spread of sensitive technologies from declared facilities, resulting in their illegal transfer to other entities; • Diversion of nuclear materials from declared fuel cycle facilities; • Running a military program at undeclared fuel cycle facilities; and • Breakout–that is, withdrawal from the npt and the subsequent use of safeguarded nuclear facilities for military purposes. The reality of these dangers was recently demonstrated by North Korea and the A.Q. Khan network. International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei has said that the fuel cycle is the “Achilles heel” of the nonproliferation system.8 Some countries have already declared their right to acquire enrichment and reprocessing technologies. This right is in fact secured for countries party to the npt. The npt does not restrict peaceful development and use of nuclear power; Article IV of the Treaty asserts, “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.” However, in ensuring the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy, the npt also imposes specific obligations upon its member states. In accordance with Article II of the npt, “Each non-nuclearweapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly. ” Article III requires that each Treaty participant state “undertakes to accept safeguards . . . for the exclusive purpose of veri½cation of the ful½llment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons.” The right to develop the nuclear fuel cycle, afforded by the npt, is considered by some to be a loophole in the nonproliferation regime. This loophole, and recent violations of commonly accepted obligations by certain countries, raises questions about the npt’s capacity to protect international security adequately from threats that may occur. It would be wrong to blame the authors of the npt for this loophole. Over the four decades that have passed since the npt ½rst came into effect, the world has changed dramatically. The npt to a large extent was initially intended to prevent creation of nuclear weapons by industrially advanced countries such as West Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, South Korea, Taiwan, and others, while simultaneously providing them the bene½t of peaceful nuclear use and security guarantees. When the npt was being negotiated in the 1960s, hardly anyone could have imagined that, with time, the main actors in proliferation and the dangers arising from it would come to be those countries that had recently become liberated from Europe’s colonial dominion (at the time called “developing” or “third-world” countries) and also non-state entities– namely, terrorist organizations. Considering that objective forces are compelling more and more countries to turn to nuclear energy to satisfy their energy needs, and that they have the right to develop the nuclear fuel cycle, it is necessary to search for solutions that, on the one hand, would prevent proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies and, on the other hand, would ensure interested countries guaranteed access to external sources of nuclear fuel cycle services and products.

#### Squo nuclear power means quick breakout—asymmetric development of arsenals creates imbalances that undermine deterrent relationships

Sokolski 9

Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 6/1/2009, Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5534

Finally, several new nuclear weapons contenders are also likely to emerge in the next two to three decades. Among these might be Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Algeria, Brazil (which is developing a nuclear submarine and the uranium to fuel it), Argentina, and possibly Saudi Arabia (courtesy of weapons leased to it by Pakistan or China), Egypt, Syria, and Turkey. All of these states have either voiced a desire to acquire nuclear weapons or tried to do so previously and have one or more of the following: A nuclear power program, a large research reactor, or plans to build a large power reactor by 2030.

With a large reactor program inevitably comes a large number of foreign nuclear experts (who are exceedingly difficult to track and identify) and extensive training, which is certain to include nuclear fuel making.19 Thus, it will be much more difficult to know when and if a state is acquiring nuclear weapons (covertly or overtly) and far more dangerous nuclear technology and materials will be available to terrorists than would otherwise. Bottom line: **As more states bring large reactors on line more will become nuclear-weapons-ready** — i.e., **they could come within months of acquiring nuclear weapons** if they chose to do so.20 As for nuclear safeguards keeping apace, neither the iaea’s nuclear inspection system (even under the most optimal conditions) nor technical trends in nuclear fuel making (e.g., silex laser enrichment, centrifuges, new South African aps enrichment techniques, filtering technology, and crude radiochemistry plants, which are making successful, small, affordable, covert fuel manufacturing even more likely)21 afford much cause for optimism.

This brave new nuclear world will stir existing security alliance relations more than it will settle them: In the case of states such as Japan, South Korea, and Turkey, it could prompt key allies to go ballistic or nuclear on their own.

Nuclear 1914

At a minimum, **such developments will be a departure from whatever stability existed during the Cold War**. After World War II, there was a clear subordination of nations to one or another of the two superpowers’ strong alliance systems — the U.S.-led free world and the Russian-Chinese led Communist Bloc. The net effect was relative peace with only small, nonindustrial wars. This alliance tension and system, however, no longer exist. Instead, we now have one superpower, the United States, that is capable of overthrowing small nations unilaterally with conventional arms alone, associated with a relatively weak alliance system ( nato) that includes two European nuclear powers (France and the uk). nato is increasingly integrating its nuclear targeting policies. The U.S. also has retained its security allies in Asia (Japan, Australia, and South Korea) but has seen the emergence of an increasing number of nuclear or nuclear-weapon-armed or -ready states.

So far, the U.S. has tried to cope with independent nuclear powers by making them “strategic partners” (e.g., India and Russia), nato nuclear allies (France and the uk), “non-nato allies” (e.g., Israel and Pakistan), and strategic stakeholders (China); or by fudging if a nation actually has attained full nuclear status (e.g., Iran or North Korea, which, we insist, will either not get nuclear weapons or will give them up). In this world, every nuclear power center (our European nuclear nato allies), the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan could have significant diplomatic security relations or ties with one another but none of these ties is viewed by Washington (and, one hopes, by no one else) as being as important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed entities (see Figure 3).

There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the **actions of just one or two states** or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state **could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing**. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear states.22 Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below):

Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: **Small differences between nuclear competitors** that would **put all actors on edge**; an overhang of nuclear materials **that could be called upon to break out** or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings.

In such a setting, the military and nuclear **rivalries between** states could easily **be much more intense than before**. Certainly **each nuclear state’s military would place a**n even higher **premium** than before **on being able to weaponize** its military and **civilian surpluses quickly**, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options.

Certainly, in such a world, relations between states could become far less stable. **Relatively small developments** — e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. — **could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with “strategic” consequences** (**arms races, strategic miscues, and** even **nuclear war**). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world “every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today.”23 In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want. None of this, however, is inevitable.

#### Prolif cascades cause militarization of disputes—escalates to great power war

Kroenig 9

Matt Kroenig, assistant professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, November 2009, Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation, http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/19671/beyond\_optimism\_and\_pessimism.html

**Nuclear proliferation** can **embolden new nuclear states**, **triggering regional instability that could** potentially **threaten** the **interests of power-projecting states and** even **entrap them in regional disputes**. New nuclear weapon states may be more aggressive and this newfound assertiveness can result in regional instability. I define regional instability as a heightened frequency (but not necessarily the intensity) of militarized interstate disputes among states in a given geographical region. The threat that regional instability poses to power-projecting states is different from the concern about international instability expressed by the proliferation pessimists. Pessimists assume that international instability is bad in and of itself – and they may be right. But, power-projecting states have a different concern. They worry that nuclear proliferation will set off regional instability and that, because they have the ability to project power over the new nuclear weapon state, they will be compelled to intervene in a costly conflict. Power-projecting states could feel the need to act as a mediator between nuclear-armed disputants, provide conventional military assistance to one of the parties in the dispute, or because they have the ability to put boots on the ground in the new nuclear state, potentially be drawn into the fighting themselves.

There is direct evidence that nuclear weapons can contribute to regional instability. Robert Rauchhaus has demonstrated that **nuclear weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear weapon states**. 46 Michael Horowitz extends this analysis to show that **aggressiveness is most pronounced in new nuclear states** **that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy**.47 These related findings are not due to the fact that dispute-prone states are more likely to acquire nuclear weapons; the scholars carefully control for a state’s selection into nuclear status. Rather, the findings demonstrate that nuclear weapons increase the frequency with which their possessors participate in militarized disputes. Qualitative studies have also provided supporting evidence of nuclear weapons’ potentially destabilizing effects. Research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, **encouraging them to initiate militarized disputes** against India.48

Proliferation optimists counter that nuclear proliferation should increase regional stability, but the most recent empirical investigations undermine the stronger versions of the optimism argument.49 While nuclear-armed states may be less likely to experience full-scale war providing some support for the optimist position, **the preponderance of evidence suggests that nuclear-armed states are more likely to engage in** other types of **militarized disputes**.50 This is true whether only one state or all of the contentious actors in a region possess nuclear weapons.51

Furthermore, for the sake of argument, even if nuclear proliferation does have stabilizing effects as optimists argue, as long as regional conflict among nuclear-armed states is possible, the basic argument presented here still holds. This is because power-projecting states may still feel compelled to intervene in the conflicts that do occur. These are conflicts that they perhaps **could have avoided had nuclear weapons been absent**.

There is direct evidence that regional conflicts involving nuclear powers can encourage power-projecting states to become involved in nuclear disputes. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was reluctant to aid Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War until Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir threatened that, without U.S. assistance, she might be forced to use nuclear weapons against the Arab armies.52 In response, Kissinger reversed his decision and provided emergency aid to the Israeli DefenseForces.53 The Soviet Union also considered a military intervention to help its Arab proxies in the Yom Kippur War, causing the United States to go on nuclear alert, and leading leaders in both Moscow and Washington to consider the very real possibility that a conflict involving a regional nuclear power could spiral into a superpower war.54 Similarly, in 1999 and 2002, the United States became caught in diplomatic initiatives to prevent nuclear war in crises between the nuclear- armed countries of India and Pakistan.55

Indeed, the expectation that powerful states will intervene in conflicts involving a nuclear-armed state is so firmly ingrained in the strategic thinking of national leaders that small nuclear powers actually incorporate it into their strategic doctrines. South Africa’s nuclear doctrine envisioned, in the event of an imminent security threat, the detonation of a nuclear weapon, not against the threatening party, but over the Atlantic Ocean in an attempt to jolt the United States into intervening on South Africa’s behalf.56 Israel’s nuclear doctrine was also constructed along similar lines. While the Israelis are notoriously silent about the existence and purpose of their nuclear arsenal, Francis Perrin, a French official who assisted in the development of Israel’s nuclear program in the 1950s and 1960s, explained that Israel’s arsenal was originally aimed “against the Americans, not to launch against America, but to say ‘If you don’t want to help us in a critical situation, we will require you to help us. Otherwise, we will use our nuclear bombs.’”57 Similarly, Pakistan’s surprise raid on Indian-controlled Kargil in 1999 was motivated partly by the expectation that Pakistan would be able to retain any territory it was able to seize quickly, because Pakistani officials calculated that the United States would never allow an extended conflict in nuclear South Asia.58

For these reasons, power-projecting states worry about the effect of nuclear proliferation on regional stability. U.S. officials feared that nuclear proliferation in Israel could embolden Israel against its Arab enemies, or entice Arab states to launch a preventive military strike on Israel’s nuclear arsenal. In a 1963 NIE on Israel’s nascent nuclear program, the consensus view of the U.S. intelligence community was that if Israel acquired nuclear weapons, “Israel’s policy toward its neighbors would become more rather than less tough...it would seek to exploit the psychological advantage of its nuclear capability to intimidate the Arabs.”59 President Kennedy concurred. In a letter to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, Kennedy wrote that Israel should abandon its nuclear program because Israel’s “development of such (nuclear) weapons would dangerously threaten the stability of thearea.”60 Similarly, in the case of China’s nuclear program, U.S. officials believed that a nuclear-armed China would “be more willing to take risks in military probing operations because of an overoptimistic assessment of its psychological advantage.”61

More recently, U.S. officials have continued to fear the effect of nuclear proliferation on regional stability. In a 1986 Top Secret CIA Assessment, U.S. intelligence analysts predicted that a nuclear North Korea would have “a free hand to conduct paramilitary operations without provoking a response.”62 Similarly, a U.S. expert testified before Congress in 2006 that “A nuclear arsenal in the hands of Iran’s current theocratic regime will be a source of both regional and global instability.”63

U.S. officials assessed that regional instability set off by nuclear proliferation could compel them to intervene directly in regional conflicts. In the early 1960s, U.S. officials speculated that Israel could potentially leverage its nuclear arsenal to compel the United States to intervene on its behalf in Middle Eastern crises.64 Similarly, in 1965, Henry Rowen, an official in the Department of Defense, assessed that if India acquired nuclear weapons, it could lead to a conflict in South Asia “with a fair chance of spreading and involving the UnitedStates.”65 At the time of writing, U.S. defense strategists are planning for the possibility that the United States may be compelled to intervene in regional conflicts involving a nuclear-armed Iran or North Korea and their neighbors.66

Leaders in power-projecting states also fear that **regional instability set off by nuclear** proliferation could entrap power-projecting states in a **great power war**. Other power- projecting states, facing a mirror-image situation, may feel compelled to intervene in a crisis to secure their own interests, **entangling multiple great powers in a regional conflict**. In a 1963 NIE, U.S. intelligence analysts assessed that “the impact of (nuclear proliferation in the Middle East) will be the possibility that hostilities arising out of existing or future controversies could escalate into a confrontation involving the major powers.”67 President Johnson believed that a nuclear Israel meant increased Soviet involvement in the Middle East and perhaps superpower war.68 If historical experience provides a guide, U.S. strategists at the time of writing are undoubtedly concerned by the possibility that China may feel compelled to intervene in any conflict involving a nuclear-armed North Korea, making the Korean Peninsula another dangerous flash-point in the uncertain Sino-American strategic relationship.

#### Cold War no longer applies—nuclear war

Cimbala 8

Stephen Cimbala, Ph.D., Penn State Brandywine Political Science Distinguished Professor, 2008, Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia, Comparative Strategy Volume 27, Issue 2

The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. **States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems** will be thrown into a **matrix of complex political, social, and cultural** **crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war**. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or **risk aversion that marked the Cold War**, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect. 12

The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because **plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory** or other issues. 13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another's vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on.

**The** short flight times **of ballistic missiles between** the cities or military forces of **contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment** by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike–**vulnerable forces and command-control systems** that **increase decision pressures for rapid, and** possibly **mistaken, retaliation**.

This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century). 14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare. 15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete. 16 **The spread of WMD** and ballistic missiles in Asia could **overturn** these **expectations for the obsolescence** or marginalization **of major interstate warfare**.

For theorists, the argument that the spread of nuclear weapons might be fully compatible with international stability, and perhaps even supportive of international security, may be less sustainable than hitherto. 17 Theorists optimistic about the ability of the international order to accommodate the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the present century have made several plausible arguments based on international systems and deterrence theory. First, nuclear weapons may make states more risk averse as opposed to risk acceptant, with regard to brandishing military power in support of foreign policy objectives. Second, if states' nuclear forces are second-strike survivable, they contribute to reduced fears of surprise attack. Third, the motives of states with respect to the existing international order are crucial. Revisionists will seek to use nuclear weapons to overturn the existing balance of power; status quo–oriented states will use nuclear forces to support the existing distribution of power, and therefore, slow and peaceful change, as opposed to sudden and radical power transitions.

These arguments, for a less alarmist view of nuclear proliferation, take comfort from the history of nuclear policy in the “first nuclear age,” roughly corresponding to the Cold War. 18 Pessimists who predicted that some thirty or more states might have nuclear weapons by the end of the century were proved wrong. However, **the Cold War is a dubious precedent for the control of nuclear weapons** spread outside of Europe. The military and security agenda of the Cold War was dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, especially with regard to nuclear weapons. Ideas about mutual deterrence based on second-strike capability and the deterrence “rationality” according to American or allied Western concepts might be inaccurate guides to the avoidance of war outside of Europe.

#### A strong SMR industry’s key to US leadership, market share, and cradle to grave

Mandel 9

(Jenny – Scientific American, Environment & Energy Publishing, LLC, “Less Is More for Designers of "Right-Sized" Nuclear Reactors” September 9, 2009, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=small-nuclear-power-plant-station-mini-reactor)

Tom Sanders, president of the American Nuclear Society and manager of Sandia National Laboratories' Global Nuclear Futures Initiative, has been stumping for small rectors for more than a decade. American-made small reactors, Sanders insists, can play a central role in global nonproliferation efforts. "Our role at Sandia is the national security-driven notion that it's in the interests of the U.S. to be one of the dominant nuclear suppliers," Sanders said. While U.S. companies have been exiting the industry over the past decades as government and popular support for new construction has waned, Sanders maintains that **strong U.S. participation in the nuclear energy marketplace** would give diplomats a new tool to use with would-be nuclear powers. "It's hard to tell Iran what to do if you don't have anything Iran wants," he explained. Sanders said mini-reactors are ideal to sell to developing countries that want to boost their manufacturing might and that would otherwise look to other countries for nuclear technologies**. If the U**nited **S**tates **is not participating in that market**, he said, **it becomes hard to steer buyers away from technologies that pose greater proliferation risks.** Sanders been promoting this view since the 1990s, he said, when he realized "we were no longer selling nuclear goods and services, so we could no longer write the rules." The domestic nuclear industry had basically shut down, with no new construction in decades **and a flight of talent and ideas overseas**. There is a silver lining in that brain drain, though, he believes, in that U.S. companies getting back into the game now are less tied to the traditional, giant plants and are freer to innovate. A feature that several of the new product designs share is that the power plants could be mass-produced in a factory to minimize cost, using robots to ensure consistency. Also, with less design work for each installation, the time to complete an order would be shortened and some of the capital and other costs associated with long lead times avoided, Sanders said. Another feature he favors is building the plants with a lifetime supply of fuel sealed inside. Shipped loaded with fuel, such reactors could power a small city for 20 years without the host country ever handling it. Once depleted, the entire plant would be packed back up and shipped back to the United States, he said, with the sensitive spent fuel still sealed away inside. Sanders is working on a reactor design hatched by the lab with an undisclosed private partner. He believes it is feasible to build a prototype modular reactor -- including demonstration factory components and a mockup of the reactor itself -- as early as 2014, for less than a billion dollars. A mini-reactor could ring up at less than $200 million, he said, or at $300 million to $400 million with 20 years of fuel. At $3,000 to $4,000 per kilowatt, he said, that would amount to significant savings over estimates of $4,000 to $6,000 per kilowatt for construction alone with traditional plant designs. To get a design ready to build, Sanders is urging a partnership between the government and the private sector. "If it's totally a government research program, labs can take 20 to 30 years" to finish such projects, he said. "If it becomes a research science project, it could go on forever." New approach, old debates So far, **there is no sign that the** government's nuclear gatekeeper, **NRC, is wowed by the small-reactor designs.** NRC's Office of New Reactors warned Babcock & Wilcox in June that the agency "will need to limit interactions with the designers of small power reactors to occasional meetings or other nonresource-intensive activities" over the next two years because of a crowded schedule of work on other proposals. Meanwhile, opponents of nuclear technologies are not convinced that small reactors are an improvement over traditional designs. Arjun Makhijani, who heads the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, a think tank that advocates against nuclear power, sees disseminating the technology as incompatible with controlling it. "A lot of the proliferation issue is not linked to having or not having plutonium or highly enriched uranium, but who has the expertise to have or make bombs," Makhijani said. "In order to spread nuclear technologies, you have to have the people who have the expertise in nuclear engineering, who know about nuclear materials and chain reactions and things like that -- the same expertise for nuclear bombs. That doesn't suffice for you to make a bomb, but then if you clandestinely acquire the materials, then you can make a bomb." Peter Wilk, acting program director for safe energy with Physicians for Social Responsibility, an anti-nuclear group, argues that expanding nuclear power use runs counter to the goal of nonproliferation. "The whole proposition presupposes an ... international economy in which more and more fuel is produced and more and more waste must be dealt with, which only makes those problems that are still unsolved larger," he said. "It may or may not do a better job of preventing the host country from literally getting their hands on it, but it doesn't reduce the amount of fuel in the world or the amount of waste in the world," Wilk added. And then there is the issue of public opinion. "Imagine that Americans would agree to take the waste that is generated in other countries and deal with it here," Makhijani said. "At the present moment, it should be confined to the level of the fantastic, or even the surreal. If [the technology's backers] could come up with a plan for the waste, then we could talk about export." Makhijani pointed to a widely touted French process for recycling nuclear waste as a red herring (ClimateWire, May 18). "It's a mythology that it ameliorates the waste problem," he said. According to Makhijani's calculations, the French recycling process generates far more radioactive waste than it cleans up. One category of highly radioactive material, which ends up stored in glass "logs" for burial, is reduced, he said. But in processing the waste, about six times the original volume of waste is produced, he said. Much of that must be buried deep underground, and the discharge of contaminated wastewater used in recycling has angered neighboring countries, he said. Operational risk, of course, is another major concern. "One has reduced the amount of unnecessary risk," Wilke said, "but it's still unnecessary risk." He added, "I get the theory that smaller, newer, ought to be safer. The question is: Why pursue this when there are so many better alternatives?" To Sandia's Sanders, Wilke is asking the wrong question. With the governments of major economies like China, Russia and Japan putting support and cash into nuclear technologies, the power plants are here to stay, he believes. "There's going to be a thousand reactors built over the next 50 years," he said. "The question is: Are we building them, or are we just importing them?"

#### Only commercial and diplomatic leadership solves ENR

**BPC 12**, Bipartisan Policy Center, “Maintaining U.S. Leadership in Global Nuclear Energy Markets”, July, <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Leadership%20in%20Nuclear%20Energy%20Markets.pdf>

Strategic Goal: Continued strong U.S. leadership in global nuclear security matters is central to protecting our national security interests. In particular, U.S. leadership in nuclear technology and operations can strengthen U.S. influence with respect to other countries’ nuclear programs and the evolution of the international nonproliferation regime, while also supporting U.S. competitiveness in a major export market. Nuclear power technologies are distinct from other potential exports in energy or in other sectors where America’s competitive advantage may also be declining. Because of the potential link between commercial technology and weapons development, nuclear power is directly linked to national security concerns, including the threat of proliferation. Although reactors themselves do not pose significant proliferation risks, both uranium-enrichment and spent fuel–processing technologies can be misused for military purposes. If U.S. nuclear energy leadership continues to diminish, our nation will be facing a situation in which decisions about the technological capabilities and location of fuel-cycle facilities throughout the world will be made without significant U.S. participation. Leadership is important in both commercial and diplomatic arenas, and it requires a vibrant domestic industry; an effective, independent regulator; access to competitive and innovative technologies and services; and the ability to offer practical solutions to safety, security, and nonproliferation challenges (an international fuel bank, for example, could help address concerns about the proliferation of uranium-enrichment capabilities). COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR OPERATIONS As the world’s largest commercial nuclear operator and dominant weapons state, the United States has traditionally been the clear leader on international nuclear issues. Today, the United States still accounts for approximately one-quarter of commercial nuclear reactors in operation around the world and one-third of global nuclear generation.33 This position is likely to shift in coming decades, as new nuclear investments go forward in other parts of the world while slowing or halting in the United States. In past decades, the United States was also a significant exporter of nuclear materials and technologies, but this dominance too has slowly declined. At present, however, the U.S. safety and security infrastructure and regulatory framework remain without peer and U.S. expertise and guidance on operational and regulatory issues continues to be sought around the world. The domestic nuclear industry established the INPO in the wake of the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 in a collective effort to hold all industry players accountable to the highest standards for safe and reliable commercial operations. Similarly, the NRC is seen as the gold standard for commercial nuclear regulation. As long as other countries seek to learn from the experience and expertise of U.S. firms and regulators, the United States will enjoy greater access to international nuclear programs. A substantial reduction in domestic nuclear energy activities could erode U.S. international standing. COMPETITIVE COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR EXPORTS As an active participant in commercial markets, the United States has considerable leverage internationally through the 123 Agreements (in reference to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act) and Consent Rights on nuclear technologies exported by the U.S. nuclear industry. These mechanisms provide a direct and effective source of leverage over other countries’ fuel-cycle decisions. U.S. diplomatic influence is also important, but absent an active role in commercial markets, it may not be sufficient to project U.S. influence and interests with respect to nuclear nonproliferation around the world. At an October 2011 Nuclear Initiative workshop on “Effective Approaches for U.S. Participation in a More Secure Global Nuclear Market,” Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel B. Poneman framed commerce and security not as competing objectives but as “inextricably intertwined.”34 He also highlighted several ways in which a robust domestic nuclear energy industry can further our country’s nonproliferation goals. Deputy Secretary Poneman emphasized the importance of U.S. leadership not only in the commercial marketplace but in international nonproliferation organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well. In addition, BPC’s Nuclear Initiative recognizes that a nuclear accident is a low-probability event that would have high consequences regionally or globally. Many countries that have expressed interest in, or the intention to, develop domestic nuclear power lack important infrastructure, education, and regulatory institutions. We believe that, if these programs move forward, the United States has a critical commercial and advisory role to play.

#### Cradle to grave solves cascades

McGoldrick 11

Fred McGoldrick, CSIS, spent 30 years at the U.S. State and Energy Departments and at the U.S. mission to the IAEA, negotiated peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with a number of countries and helped shape the policy of the United States to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, May 2011, Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, Constraints, Options, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/MTA-NSG-report-color.pdf

The U.S. has been exploring the possibilities of developing offers by one or more suppliers to lease or sell power reactor fuel to consumer states, with the understanding that the resultant spent fuel would be returned to one of the supplier countries or to suitable alternative locations, such as a regional or international used fuel storage facility or waste repository, (if a host state can be found), where it would be treated, recycled or where wastes could be ultimately disposed of. 4.3.1 Offering a Broad-based Cradle-to-Grave Fuel Cycle Service. This option would involve a major diplomatic initiative to explore the possibility that one or more supplier states could offer cradle-to-grave services to all states without E&R plants as an incentive for states to forgo the development of such capabilities. Advantages If one or more suppliers could offer a “cradle-to-grave” fuel supply program, it could prove to be far more effective than some other techniques in discouraging the spread of reprocessing facilities. Because the commercial market already provides strong assurance of fresh fuel supply, while management of spent fuel is unresolved, such a service offer could create stronger incentives for countries to rely on international fuel supply than steps such as fuel banks would. Russia has already implemented such a program on a limited scale. Moscow has concluded an agreement to provide fresh nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran and to take back the used nuclear fuel to Russia. The Russians have also taken back some spent pow- er reactor fuel from East European countries and have indicated that they might be willing to consider taking back spent fuel of Russian-origin in the future—they have recently offered such deals to Vietnam and Turkey—but do not seem ready to accept spent fuel produced from fuel from non-Russian suppliers. If Russia were to offer a broad-based a cradle-to-grave program, **it may put pressure on its competitors in the reactor and enrichment markets to** try to **follow suit**. If a country agreed to accept spent fuel from other countries on a commercial basis, the supplier of the fresh fuel and the country to which the spent fuel was sent would not have to be the same for a cradle-to-grave service to work.

### solvency

#### DoD acquisition of SMR’s ensures rapid military adoption, commercialization, and U.S. leadership

Andres and Breetz 11

Richard Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, and Hanna Breetz, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Small Nuclear Reactorsfor Military Installations:Capabilities, Costs, andTechnological Implications, [www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf)

Thus far, this paper has reviewed two of DOD’s most pressing energy vulnerabilities—grid insecurity and fuel convoys—and explored how they could be addressed by small reactors. We acknowledge that there are many uncertainties and risks associated with these reactors. On the other hand, failing to pursue these technologies raises its own set of risks for DOD, which we review in this section: first, small reactors may fail to be commercialized in the United States; second, the designs that get locked in by the private market may not be optimal for DOD’s needs; and third, expertise on small reactors may become concentrated in foreign countries. By taking an early “first mover” role in the small reactor market, DOD could mitigate these risks and secure the long-term availability and appropriateness of these technologies for U.S. military applications. The “Valley of Death.” Given the promise that small reactors hold for military installations and mobility, DOD has a compelling interest in ensuring that they make the leap from paper to production. However, if DOD does not provide an initial demonstration and market, there is a chance that the U.S. small reactor industry may never get off the ground. The leap from the laboratory to the marketplace is so difficult to bridge that it is widely referred to as the “Valley of Death.” Many promising technologies are never commercialized due to a variety of market failures— including technical and financial uncertainties, information asymmetries, capital market imperfections, transaction costs, and environmental and security externalities— that impede financing and early adoption and can lock innovative technologies out of the marketplace. 28 In such cases, the Government can help a worthy technology to bridge the Valley of Death by accepting the first mover costs and demonstrating the technology’s scientific and economic viability.29 [FOOTNOTE 29: There are numerous actions that the Federal Government could take, such as conducting or funding research and development, stimulating private investment, demonstrating technology, mandating adoption, and guaranteeing markets. Military procurement is thus only one option, but it has often played a decisive role in technology development and is likely to be the catalyst for the U.S. small reactor industry. See Vernon W. Ruttan, Is War Necessary for Economic Growth? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Kira R. Fabrizio and David C. Mowery, “The Federal Role in Financing Major Inventions: Information Technology during the Postwar Period,” in Financing Innovation in the United States, 1870 to the Present, ed. Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007), 283–316.] Historically, nuclear power has been “the most clear-cut example . . . of an important general-purpose technology that in the absence of military and defense related procurement would not have been developed at all.”30 **Government involvement is likely to be crucial for innovative, next-generation nuclear technology** as well. Despite the widespread revival of interest in nuclear energy, Daniel Ingersoll has argued that radically innovative designs face an uphill battle, as “the high capital cost of nuclear plants and the painful lessons learned during the first nuclear era have created a prevailing fear of first-of-a-kind designs.”31 In addition, Massachusetts Institute of Technology reports on the Future of Nuclear Power called for the Government to provide modest “first mover” assistance to the private sector due to several barriers that have hindered the nuclear renaissance, such as securing high up-front costs of site-banking, gaining NRC certification for new technologies, and demonstrating technical viability.32 It is possible, of course, that small reactors will achieve commercialization without DOD assistance. As discussed above, they have garnered increasing attention in the energy community. Several analysts have even argued that small reactors could play a key role in the second nuclear era, given that they may be the only reactors within the means of many U.S. utilities and developing countries.33 However, given the tremendous regulatory hurdles and technical and financial uncertainties, it appears far from certain that the U.S. small reactor industry will take off. If DOD wants to ensure that small reactors are available in the future, then it should pursue a leadership role now. Technological Lock-in. A second risk is that if small reactors do reach the market without DOD assistance, the designs that succeed may not be optimal for DOD’s applications. Due to a variety of positive feedback and increasing returns to adoption (including demonstration effects, technological interdependence, network and learning effects, and economies of scale), the designs that are initially developed can become “locked in.”34 Competing designs—even if they are superior in some respects or better for certain market segments— can face barriers to entry that lock them out of the market. If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred designs are not locked out, then it should take a first mover role on small reactors. It is far too early to gauge whether the private market and DOD have aligned interests in reactor designs. On one hand, Matthew Bunn and Martin Malin argue that what the world needs is cheaper, safer, more secure, and more proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors; presumably, many of the same broad qualities would be favored by DOD.35 There are many varied market niches that could be filled by small reactors, because there are many different applications and settings in which they can be used, and it is quite possible that some of those niches will be compatible with DOD’s interests.36 On the other hand, DOD may have specific needs (transportability, for instance) that would not be a high priority for any other market segment. Moreover, while DOD has unique technical and organizational capabilities that could enable it to pursue more radically innovative reactor lines, DOE has indicated that it will focus its initial small reactor deployment efforts on LWR designs.37 **If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred reactors are developed and available in the future, it should take a leadership role now**. Taking a first mover role does not necessarily mean that DOD would be “picking a winner” among small reactors, as the market will probably pursue multiple types of small reactors. Nevertheless, **DOD leadership would likely have a profound effect on the industry’s timeline and trajectory.** Domestic Nuclear Expertise. From the perspective of larger national security issues, if DOD does not catalyze the small reactor industry, there is a risk that expertise in small reactors could become dominated by foreign companies. A 2008 Defense Intelligence Agency report warned that the United States will become totally dependent on foreign governments for future commercial nuclear power unless the military acts as the prime mover to reinvigorate this critical energy technology with small, distributed power reactors.38 Several of the most prominent small reactor concepts rely on technologies perfected at Federally funded laboratories and research programs, including the Hyperion Power Module (Los Alamos National Laboratory), NuScale (DOE-sponsored research at Oregon State University), IRIS (initiated as a DOE-sponsored project), Small and Transportable Reactor (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), and Small, Sealed, Transportable, Autonomous Reactor (developed by a team including the Argonne, Lawrence Livermore, and Los Alamos National Laboratories). However, there are scores of competing designs under development from over a dozen countries. If DOD does not act early to support the U.S. small reactor industry, there is a chance that the industry could be dominated by foreign companies. Along with other negative consequences, the decline of the U.S. nuclear industry decreases the NRC’s influence on the technology that supplies the world’s rapidly expanding demand for nuclear energy. Unless U.S. companies begin to retake global market share, in coming decades France, China, South Korea, and Russia will dictate standards on nuclear reactor reliability, performance, and **proliferation resistance**.

#### Alternative financing arrangements reduce costs and spur unique commercial spillover

Fitzpatrick, Freed and Eyoan, 11

Ryan Fitzpatrick, Senior Policy Advisor for Clean Energy at Third Way, Josh Freed, Vice President for Clean Energy at Third Way, and Mieke Eoyan, Director for National Security at Third Way, June 2011, Fighting for Innovation: How DoD Can Advance CleanEnergy Technology... And Why It Has To, content.thirdway.org/publications/414/Third\_Way\_Idea\_Brief\_-\_Fighting\_for\_Innovation.pdf

The DoD has over $400 billion in annual purchasing power, which means **the Pentagon could provide a sizeable market for new technologies**. **This can increase a technology’s scale of production, bringing down costs, and making the product** **more likely to successfully reach commercial markets**. **Unfortunately**, many potentially significant clean energy **innovations never get to the marketplace, due to a lack of capital** **during** the development and **demonstration stages. As a result,** **technologies that could help the military** meet its clean energy security and cost goals **are being abandoned or co-opted by competetors like China** before they are commercially viable here in the U.S. **By focusing its purchasing power on innovative products that will** help **meet its energy goals, DoD can provide** more **secure** and **cost-effective energy to the military—producing tremendous long-term savings**, while also **bringing** potentially **revolutionary technologies to the public**. Currently, many of these **technologies are passed over during** the **procurement** process **because of** higher **upfront costs—even if these technologies can reduce life-cycle costs** to DoD. The Department has only recently begun to consider life-cycle costs and the “fullyburdened cost of fuel” (FBCF) when making acquisition decisions. However, initial reports from within DoD suggest that the methodology for determining the actual FBCF needs to be refined and made more consistent before it can be successfully used in the acquisition process.32 The Department should fast-track this process to better maximize taxpayer dollars. Congressional appropriators— and the Congressional Budget Office—should also recognize the **savings that can be achieved by procuring advanced technologies to promote DoD’s energy goals**, even if these procurements come with higher upfront costs. Even if the Pentagon makes procurement of emerging clean energy technologies a higher priority, it still faces real roadblocks in developing relationships with the companies that make them. Many clean energy innovations are developed by small businesses or companies that have no previous experience working with military procurement officers. Conversely, many procurement officers do not know the clean energy sector and are not incentivized to develop relationships with emerging clean energy companies. Given the stakes in developing domestic technologies that would help reduce costs and improve mission success, the Pentagon should develop a program to encourage a better flow of information between procurement officers and clean energy companies—especially small businesses. Leverage Savings From Efficiency and Alternative Financing to Pay for Innovation. **In an age of government-wide austerity and tight** Pentagon **budgets**, current congressional **appropriations are simply not sufficient** to fund clean energy innovation. **Until Congress decides to direct additional resources** for this purpose, the **Defense** Department **must leverage** the money and other **tools it already has** to help develop clean energy. This can take two forms: repurposing money that was saved through energy efficiency programs for innovation and using alternative methods of financing to reduce the cost to the Pentagon of deploying clean energy. For several decades **the military has made** modest **use alternative financing** mechanisms t**o fund** clean **energy** and efficiency **projects when appropriated funds were insufficient**. In a 2010 report, GAO found that while only 18% of renewable energy projects on DoD lands used alternative financing, these projects account for 86% of all renewable energy produced on the Department’s property.33 This indicates that alternative financing can be particularly helpful to DoD in terms of bringing larger and more expensive projects to fruition. One advanced financing tool available to DoD is the energy savings performance contract (ESPC). These agreements allow DoD to contract a private firm to make upgrades to a building or other facility that result in energy savings, reducing overall energy costs without appropriated funds. The firm finances the cost, maintenance and operation of these upgrades and recovers a profit over the life of the contract. While mobile applications consume 75% of the Department’s energy,34 DoD is only authorized to enter an ESPC for energy improvements done at stationary sites. As such, Congress should allow DoD to conduct pilot programs in which ESPCs are used to enhance mobile components like aircraft and vehicle engines. This could accelerate the needed replacement or updating of aging equipment and a significant reduction of energy with no upfront cost. To maximize the potential benefits of ESPCs, DoD should work with the Department of Energy to develop additional training and best practices to ensure that terms are carefully negotiated and provide benefits for the federal government throughout the term of the contract.35 This effort could possibly be achieved through the existing memorandum of understanding between these two departments.36 The Pentagon should also consider using any long-term savings realized by these contracts for other energy purposes, including the promotion of innovative technologies to further reduce demand or increase general energy security. In addition to ESPCs, **the Pentagon** also **can enter into** extended agreements with utilities to use DoD land to generate electricity, or for the **long-term purchase of energy**. **These** **innovative financing mechanisms**, known respectively as enhanced use leases (EULs) and power purchase agreements (PPAs), **provide a valuable degree of certainty to third party generators**. In exchange, the **Department can leverage its existing resources**—either its land or its purchasing power—**to negotiate lower electricity rates** and dedicated sources of locallyproduced power with its utility partners. **DoD has unique authority among federal agencies to enter extended 30-year PPAs**, but only for geothermal energy projects and only with direct approval from the Secretary of Defense. Again, limiting incentives for clean energy generation to just geothermal power inhibits the tremendous potential of other clean energy sources to help meet DoD’s energy goals. Congress should consider opening this incentive up to other forms of clean energy generation, including the production of advanced fuels. Also, given procurement officials’ lack of familiarity with these extended agreements and the cumbersome nature of such a high-level approval process, the unique authority to enter into extended 30-year PPAs is very rarely used.37 DoD should provide officials with additional policy guidance for using extended PPAs and Congress should simplify the process by allowing the secretary of each service to approve these contracts. Congress should also investigate options for encouraging regulated utility markets to permit PPA use by DoD. Finally, when entering these agreements, the Department should make every effort to promote the use of innovative and fledgling technologies in the terms of its EULs and PPAs. CON C L U S ION **The Defense Department is in a unique position to foster and deploy innovation in clean energy technologies**. This has two enormous benefits for our military: it will make our troops and our facilities more secure and it will reduce the amount of money the Pentagon spends on energy, freeing it up for other mission critical needs. If the right steps are taken by Congress and the Pentagon, the military will be able to put its resources to work developing technologies that will lead to a stronger fighting force, a safer nation, and a critical emerging sector of the American economy. **The Defense Department has helped give birth to technologies and new economic sectors dozens of times before**. For its own sake and the sake of the economy, **it should make clean energy innovation its newest priority**.

#### SMR’s are super cost-effective and safe

Ioannis N. Kessides and Vladimir Kuznetsov 12, Ioannis is a researcher for the Development Research Group at the World Bank, Vladimir is a consultant for the World Bank, “Small Modular Reactors for Enhancing Energy Security in Developing Countries”, August 14, Sustainability 2012, 4(8), 1806-1832

SMRs offer a number of advantages that can potentially offset the overnight cost penalty that they suffer relative to large reactors. Indeed, several characteristics of their proposed designs can serve to overcome some of the key barriers that have inhibited the growth of nuclear power. These characteristics include [23,24]: \* • Reduced construction duration. The smaller size, lower power, and simpler design of SMRs allow for greater modularization, standardization, and factory fabrication of components and modules. Use of factory-fabricated modules simplifies the on-site construction activities and greatly reduces the amount of field work required to assemble the components into an operational plant. As a result, the construction duration of SMRs could be significantly shorter compared to large reactors leading to important economies in the cost of financing. \* • Investment scalability and flexibility. In contrast to conventional large-scale nuclear plants, due to their smaller size and shorter construction lead-times SMRs could be added one at a time in a cluster of modules or in dispersed and remote locations. Thus capacity expansion can be more flexible and adaptive to changing market conditions. The sizing, temporal and spatial flexibility of SMR deployment have important implications for the perceived investment risks (and hence the cost of capital) and financial costs of new nuclear build. Today’s gigawatt-plus reactors require substantial up-front investment—in excess of US$ 4 billion. Given the size of the up-front capital requirements (compared to the total capitalization of most utilities) and length of their construction time, new large-scale nuclear plants could be viewed as “bet the farm” endeavors for most utilities making these investments. SMR total capital investment costs, on the other hand, are an order of magnitude lower—in the hundreds of millions of dollars range as opposed to the billions of dollars range for larger reactors. These smaller investments can be more easily financed, especially in small countries with limited financial resources. SMR deployment with just-in-time incremental capacity additions would normally lead to a more favorable expenditure/cash flow profile relative to a single large reactor with the same aggregate capacity—even if we assume that the total time required to emplace the two alternative infrastructures is the same. This is because when several SMRs are built and deployed sequentially, the early reactors will begin operating and generating revenue while the remaining ones are being constructed. In the case of a large reactor comprising one large block of capacity addition, no revenues are generated until all of the investment expenditures are made. Thus the staggered build of SMRs could minimize the negative cash flow of deployment when compared to emplacing a single large reactor of equivalent power [25]. \* • Better power plant capacity and grid matching. In countries with small and weak grids, the addition of a large power plant (1000 MW(e) or more) can lead to grid stability problems—the general “rule of thumb” is that the unit size of a power plant should not exceed 10 percent of the overall electricity system capacity [11]. The incremental capacity expansion associated with SMR deployment, on the other hand, could help meet increasing power demand while avoiding grid instability problems. \* • Factory fabrication and mass production economies. SMR designs are engineered to be pre-fabricated and mass-produced in factories, rather than built on-site. Factory fabrication of components and modules for shipment and installation in the field with almost Lego-style assembly is generally cheaper than on-site fabrication. Relative to today’s gigawatt-plus reactors, SMRs benefit more from factory fabrication economies because they can have a greater proportion of factory made components. In fact, some SMRs could be manufactured and fully assembled at the factory, and then transported to the deployment site. Moreover, SMRs can benefit from the “economies of multiples” that accrue to mass production of components in a factory with supply-chain management. \* • Learning effects and co-siting economies. Building reactors in a series can lead to significant per-unit cost reductions. This is because the fabrication of many SMR modules on plant assembly lines facilitates the optimization of manufacturing and assembly processes. Lessons learned from the construction of each module can be passed along in the form of productivity gains or other cost savings (e.g., lower labor requirements, shorter and more efficiently organized assembly lines) in successive units (Figure 6). Moreover, additional learning effects can be realized from the construction of successive units on the same site. Thus multi-module clustering could lead to learning curve acceleration. Since more SMRs are deployed for the same amount of aggregate power as a large reactor, these learning effects can potentially play a much more important role for SMRs than for large reactors [26]. Also, sites incorporating multiple modules may require smaller operator and security staffing. \* • Design simplification. Many SMRs offer significant design simplifications relative to large-scale reactors utilizing the same technology. This is accomplished thorough the adoption of certain design features that are specific to smaller reactors. For example, fewer and simpler safety features are needed in SMRs with integral design of the primary circuit (i.e., with an in vessel location of steam generators and no large diameter piping) that effectively eliminates large break LOCA. Clearly one of the main factors negatively affecting the competitiveness of small reactors is economies of scale—SMRs can have substantially higher specific capital costs as compared to large-scale reactors. However, SMRs offer advantages that can potentially offset this size penalty. As it was noted above, SMRs may enjoy significant economic benefits due to shorter construction duration, accelerated learning effects and co-siting economies, temporal and sizing flexibility of deployment, and design simplification. When these factors are properly taken into account, then the fact that smaller reactors have higher specific capital costs due to economies of scale does not necessarily imply that the effective (per unit) capital costs (or the levelized unit electricity cost) for a combination of such reactors will be higher in comparison to a single large nuclear plant of equivalent capacity [22,25]. In a recent study, Mycoff et al. [22] provide a comparative assessment of the capital costs per unit of installed capacity of an SMR-based power station comprising of four 300 MW(e) units that are built sequentially and a single large reactor of 1200 MW(e). They employ a generic mode to quantify the impacts of: (1) economies of scale; (2) multiple units; (3) learning effects; (4) construction schedule; (5) unit timing; and (6) plant design (Figure 7). To estimate the impact of economies of scale, Mycoff et al. [22] assume a scaling factor n = 0.6 and that the two plants are comparable in design and characteristics—i.e., that the single large reactor is scaled down in its entirety to ¼ of its size. According to the standard scaling function, the hypothetical overnight cost (per unit of installed capacity) of the SMR-based power station will be 74 percent higher compared to a single large-scale reactor. Based on various studies in the literature, the authors posit that the combined impact of multiple units and learning effects is a 22 percent reduction in specific capital costs for the SMR-based station. To quantify the impact of construction schedule, the authors assume that the construction times of the large reactor and the SMR units are five and three years respectively. The shorter construction duration results in a 5 percent savings for the SMRs. Temporal flexibility (four sequentially deployed SMRs with the first going into operation at the same time as the large reactor and the rest every 9 months thereafter) and design simplification led to 5 and 15 percent reductions in specific capital costs respectively for the SMRs. When all these factors are combined, the SMR-based station suffers a specific capital cost disadvantage of only 4 percent as compared to the single large reactor of the same capacity. Thus, the economics of SMRs challenges the widely held belief that nuclear reactors are characterized by significant economies of scale [19].

#### DoE just massively increased SMR incentives, but it fails

DoD Energy Blog, 2/16/11, Good Things in Small Packages:Small Reactors for Military Power Good Things in Small Packages:Small Reactors for Military Power, dodenergy.blogspot.com/2011/02/good-things-in-small-packagessmall.html

They conclude that DOD should lead the charge for small reactors to meet their own needs as well as to make sure that the US leads that industry’s development. When first written the paper mentioned that most of the technology was stymied somewhere between the drawing board and production. But there is good news in the President’s 2011 Budget for nukes. The New York Times reported that the budget contains $500 million over five years for DOE to complete two designs and secure National Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval. The reactors will be built entirely in a factory and trucked to the site, like “modular homes”. Sounds just like what Dr. Andres ordered. **Only problem is that $500 million is only about half of the cost to get to NRC approval. Actual production is in the $2 billion neighborhood**, and that is a pricey neighborhood. Enter Amory Lovins. Amory has often derided the cost for nuclear power as an unnecessary expenditure. His argument is that micropower is the way of the future, not big honking gigawatt nuclear power plants. Although there has been a resurgence in the interest in nuclear power, **it is still difficult to find private investments willing to underwrite the expense**. Maybe the development of small nukes for national security reasons will lead to cost effective small nukes for distributed micropower nationwide. Small reactors for FOBs are more problematic. Even Bagram only needs about 25 MW with other FOBS being smaller. Security will be the first concern. If someone tries a smash and grab at Fort Hood they have to go through a couple of armored divisions and have a long way to got to get away. Kabul to Peshawar is only 128 miles. Cost shouldn’t be an overriding factor in considering secure power, but even at a 75% cost reduction in production, half a billion for 25MW is a bit much. Of course if you could produce a 300MW system, Bagram could air condition Kabul! The real soft power. My buddy, T.C. the fighter pilot, would tell you that DOD's mission is to fight and win the Nation's wars, not spark business recovery. DOD needs to focus on conserving energy. “Reducing the consumption at Miramar by 50% might save a lot of fuel and money, but I'd rather reduce consumption by 50% at PB Jugroom even though the savings in gallons and dollars are tiny.” Reducing demand reduces risk. All that being said, it may well be worth DOE and DOD efforts to explore the potential. It is something that may be beyond the means of commercial entities, but not government (See China). If there is going to be a market here, let us not be left behind as we have been with other alternative energy production means.

#### And there are 3 demo projects in progress, but no incentives

ANA 12

(Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, “ Documents Reveal Time-line and Plans for “Small Modular Reactors” (SMRs) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Unrealistic and Promise no Funding” June 8, 2012, <http://www.ananuclear.org/Issues/PlutoniumFuelMOX/tabid/75/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/558/Default.aspx>)

“While SRS may superficially appear to present certain attractive aspects for the location of SMRs, the site has not had experience with operation of nuclear reactors in over twenty years and has no current expertise in reactor operation,” said Clements. “While DOE is set to chose two SMR designs to fund for further development, SRS affirms that no construction funds will be provided, leaving vendors with the difficult and perhaps insurmountable task to find private funding for SMR construction.”

Two of the three separate “Memoranda of Agreement” for three different and still hypothetical SMR designs include deployment timelines which are already admitted by DOE to be inaccurate since they were signed less than six months ago.

#### Role of the ballot’s to simulate enactment of the plan – key to decisionmaking and fairness

Hager, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and **implement an alternative politics.** The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a **substantive policy discussion.** Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an **institutional lever** with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list. These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political **system as a whole**, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to **participate directly in politics themselves**; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48 Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishmento f a temporary parliamentaryco mmissiont o studye nergyp olicy,w hichf or the first time would draw all concernedp articipantst ogetheri n a discussiono f both short-termc hoicesa nd long-termg oals of energyp olicy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49T hese commissionsg ave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernizationa nd technicali nnovation in energy policy. Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurizationd evices. With proddingf rom the energyc ommission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and **by producing a** modernization **plan itself**, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements

. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection. III. Conclusion The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the **objections against particular projects** was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general. One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic. Parliamentary Politics In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to **formulate an alternative politics**, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry. Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program. This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. **On the other hand**, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The **lively debate** stimulated by grassroots groups and parties **keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda.** Technical Debate In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, **activists engaged in technical debate.** They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often **proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts** themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators. The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria. Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic. In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56 In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the **contribution of grassroots** environmental **groups has been significant.** As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues **has been tremendous**.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 **Policy concessions** and new legal provisions for citizen participation **have not quelled grassroots action.** The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

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#### Hegemonic strategy inevitable

Calleo, Director – European Studies Program and Professor @ SAIS, ‘10

(David P, “American Decline Revisited,” *Survival*, 52:4, 215 – 227)

The history of the past two decades suggests that adjusting to a plural world is not easy for the United States. As its economic strength is increasingly challenged by relative decline, it clings all the more to its peerless military prowess. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, that overwhelming military power, evolved over the Cold War, is less and less effective. In many respects, America's geopolitical imagination seems frozen in the posture of the Cold War. The lingering pretension to be the dominant power everywhere has encouraged the United States to hazard two unpromising land wars, plus a diffuse and interminable struggle against 'terrorism'. Paying for these wars and the pretensions behind them confirms the United States in a new version of Cold War finance. Once more, unmanageable fiscal problems poison the currency, an old pathology that firmly reinstates the nation on its path to decline. It was the hegemonic Cold War role, after all, that put the United States so out of balance with the rest of the world economy. In its hegemonic Cold War position, the United States found it necessary to run very large deficits and was able to finance them simply by creating and exporting more and more dollars. The consequence is today's restless mass of accumulated global money. Hence, whereas the value of all global financial assets in 1980 was just over 100% of global output, by 2008, even after the worst of the financial implosion, that figure had exploded to just under 300%.25 Much of this is no doubt tied up in the massive but relatively inert holdings of the Chinese and Japanese. But thanks to today's instantaneous electronic transfers, huge sums can be marshalled and deployed on very short notice. It is this excess of volatile money that arguably fuels the world's great recurring bubbles. It can create the semblance of vast real wealth for a time, but can also (with little notice) sow chaos in markets, wipe out savings and dry up credit for real investment. What constitutes a morbid overstretch in the American political economy thus ends up as a threat to the world economy in general. To lead itself and the world into a more secure future the United States must put aside its old, unmeasured geopolitical ambitions paid for by unlimited cheap credit. Instead, the United States needs a more balanced view of its role in history. But America's post-Soviet pundits have, unfortunately, proved more skilful at perpetuating outmoded dreams of past glory than at promoting the more modest visions appropriate to a plural future. One can always hope that newer generations of Americans will find it easier to adjust to pluralist reality. The last administration, however, was not very encouraging in this regard. III What about Barack Obama? So far, his economic policy has shown itself probably more intelligent and certainly more articulate than his predecessor's. His thinking is less hobbled by simple-minded doctrines. It accepts government's inescapable role in regulating markets and providing a durable framework for orderly governance and societal fellowship. To be sure, the Obama administration, following in the path of the Bush administration, has carried short-term counter-cyclical stimulation to a previously unimagined level. Perhaps so radical an expansion of credit is unavoidable under present circumstances. The administration is caught between the need to rebalance by scaling back and the fear that restraint applied now will trigger a severe depression. Obama's chief aide, Rahm Emanuel, is famous for observing: 'Rule one: Never allow a crisis to go to waste. They are opportunities to do big things.'26 So far, Obama's administration has made use of its crisis to promote an unprecedented expansion of welfare spending.27 Much of the spending is doubtless good in itself and certainly serves the administration's strong counter-cyclical purposes. But at some point the need to pass from expansion to stabilisation will presumably be inescapable. Budget cuts will have to be found somewhere, and demographic trends suggest that drastic reductions in civilian welfare spending are unlikely. Elementary prudence might suggest that today's financial crisis is an ideal occasion for America's long-overdue retreat from geopolitical overstretch, a time for bringing America's geopolitical pretensions into harmony with its diminishing foreign possibilities and expanding domestic needs. The opportunities for geopolitical saving appear significant. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), current military plans will require an average military budget of $652bn (in 2010 dollars) each year through 2028. The estimate optimistically assumes only 30,000 troops will be engaged abroad after 2013. As the CBO observes, these projections exceed the peak budgets of the Reagan administration's military build-up of the mid-1980s (about $500bn annually in 2010 dollars). This presumes a military budget consuming 3.5% of GDP through 2020.28 Comparable figures for other nations are troubling: 2.28% for the United Kingdom, 2.35% for France, 2.41% for Russia and 1.36% for China.29 Thus, while the financial crisis has certainly made Americans fear for their economic future, it does not yet seem to have resulted in a more modest view of the country's place in the world, or a more prudent approach to military spending. Instead, an addiction to hegemonic status continues to blight the prospects for sound fiscal policy. Financing the inevitable deficits inexorably turns the dollar into an imperial instrument that threatens the world with inflation.

#### Relations solve nothing – No coop

**Blumenthal 11** (Dan, Resident fellow at AEI, Current commissioner and former vice chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, where he directs efforts to monitor, investigate, and provide recommendations on the national security implications of the economic relationship between the two countries. Previously, he was senior director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia in the Secretary of Defense's Office of International Security Affairs and practiced law in New York prior to his government service. At AEI, in addition to his work on the national security implications of U.S.-Sino relations, he coordinates the Tocqueville on China project, which examines the underlying civic culture of post-Mao China. Mr. Blumenthal also contributes to AEI's Asian Outlook series and is a research associate with the National Asia Research Program. 10/3/2011, “The top ten unicorns of China policy”, http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/asia/the-top-ten-unicorns-of-china-policy/)

9) We need China's help to solve global problems. This is further down on my list because it is not really a fantastical unicorn. It is true. What is a fantasy is that China will be helpful. We do need China to disarm North Korea. They do not want to, and North Korea is now a nuclear power. The same may soon be true with Iran. The best we can get in our diplomacy with China is to stop Beijing from being less helpful. It is a fact that the global problems would be easier to manage with Chinese help. However, China actually contributing to global order is a unicorn.

#### Broader strategic cooperation outweighs

Jeffrey A. **Bader 11**, visiting scholar at the China Center at Brookings, “U.S.-China Senior Dialogue: Maintaining the Balance”, May 6, <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0506_strategic_economic_dialogue_bader.aspx>

The S&ED comes at a time when U.S.-China relations are in fundamentally sound condition. President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States was generally assessed as setting a realistic tone and achieving successes in a relationship that will always be marked by frictions. President Obama, who will be involved in the S&ED, has put a high priority on U.S.-China relations, and the two sides have cooperated, within limits, on major security issues, including Iran, Korea, Sudan, Libya, and nuclear security. From the U.S. perspective, it will certainly not hurt that the meeting comes only a week after the successful raid that eliminated Osama bin Laden, which sends a message of U.S. strength and credibility in a relationship where those qualities are always the subject of Chinese scrutiny. The United States and China have developed reasonable expectations about both the possibilities and limits of cooperation, which will reduce the chances of future miscalculation. All of these subjects, plus broader developments in the Middle East, will be on the agenda of the S&ED.

## uranium

#### No CCP collapse—the government represses instability

Pei 9(Minxin, Senior Associate in the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3/12. “Will the Chinese Communist Party Survive the Crisis?” Foreign Affairs. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64862/minxin-pei/will-the-chinese-communist-party-survive-the-crisis)

It might seem reasonable to expect that challenges from the disaffected urban middle class, frustrated college graduates, and unemployed migrants will constitute the principal threat to the party's rule. If those groups were in fact to band together in a powerful coalition, then the world's longest-ruling party would indeed be in deep trouble. But that is not going to happen. Such a revolutionary scenario overlooks two critical forces blocking political change in China and similar authoritarian political systems: the regime's capacity for repression and the unity among the elite. Economic crisis and social unrest may make it tougher for the CCP to govern, but they will not loosen the party's hold on power. A glance at countries such as Zimbabwe, North Korea, Cuba, and Burma shows that a relatively unified elite in control of the military and police can cling to power through brutal force, even in the face of abysmal economic failure. Disunity within the ruling elite, on the other hand, weakens the regime's repressive capacity and usually spells the rulers' doom. The CCP has already demonstrated its remarkable ability to contain and suppress chronic social protest and small-scale dissident movements. The regime maintains the People's Armed Police, a well-trained and well-equipped anti-riot force of 250,000. In addition, China's secret police are among the most capable in the world and are augmented by a vast network of informers. And although the Internet may have made control of information more difficult, Chinese censors can still react quickly and thoroughly to end the dissemination of dangerous news. Since the Tiananmen crackdown, the Chinese government has greatly refined its repressive capabilities. Responding to tens of thousands of riots each year has made Chinese law enforcement the most experienced in the world at crowd control and dispersion. Chinese state security services have applied the tactic of "political decapitation" to great effect, quickly arresting protest leaders and leaving their followers disorganized, demoralized, and impotent. If worsening economic conditions lead to a potentially explosive political situation, the party will stick to these tried-and-true practices to ward off any organized movement against the regime.

#### No shortage–most qualified ev

**NEI ‘12**

Nuclear Energy Institute, “Myths & Facts About Nuclear Energy”, June, http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/reliableandaffordableenergy/factsheet/myths--facts-about-nuclear-energy-january-2012/

Fact: Readily available uranium resources (5.5 million metric tons) will last at least 100 years at today’s consumption rate, according to the World Nuclear Association and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. An estimated additional 10.5 million metric tons that remain untapped will expand the available supply to at least 200 years at today’s consumption rate. The agency also determined that further exploration and improvements in extraction technology are likely to at least double this estimate over time. These estimates do not take into account the effect that increased recycling of used nuclear fuel would have on global supplies. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) recently confirmed that uranium supplies will not limit the expansion of nuclear energy in the U.S. in its 2010 study “The Future of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle.”

#### Asia solves US and Asian demand

**GBI Research ‘12**

Global Business Intelligence, “Uranium Mining Market in Asia-Pacific to 2020 - Availability of Large Uranium Reserves to Lay the Foundation for the Industry's Future Development”, June 25, <http://www.marketresearch.com/GBI-Research-v3759/Uranium-Mining-Asia-Pacific-Availability-7039053/>

Uranium mining is set to soar in the future due to rising demand for nuclear power, with Asia’s colossal reserves looking set to meet these needs, according to natural resources expert GBI Research. The new report\* suggests that mounting demand for nuclear power generation will boost uranium prices, offering to make Asia-Pacific a tidy sum, but only if they can overcome environmental and professional hazards. According to the Australian Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics and Sciences (ABARES), the spot price of uranium, which hung around the $62 per pound mark in 2011, will reach around $81 a pound by 2016 due to the massive surge in demand. The availability of huge reserves, coupled with rising prices, will drive the Asia-Pacific uranium mining industry. Asia-Pacific is the largest uranium-producing region in the world, boasting an estimated production of 34,041 tons of uranium (tU) during 2011, over half the global production. Kazakhstan contributed just under two-thirds of this, followed by Australia with 25.2%, Uzbekistan with 7.2%, China with 2.6% and India with a 1.1% share. Asia’s uranium mining industry has been helped by the region’s abundant reserves, which, according to the World Nuclear Association (WNA), stood at 3,599,421tU in 2010, accounting for about 57% of total global reserves. New planned projects and the expansion of existing uranium mines will drive up uranium mine production throughout Asia-Pacific, with Australia, India, Kazakhstan and China all being expected to increase regional uranium mine production in the outlook period.

## fuel bank

#### Causes massive backlash

Leonard Weiss 9, affiliated scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, “reliable energy supply and nonproliferation”, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 2

The problem of global warming has fostered much talk of a ‘‘nuclear renaissance’’ as a response to the need to reduce carbon emissions. But it is a virtual certainty that increasing the spread of nuclear energy technology will result in an increased risk of nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Schemes to mitigate this increased risk include internationalized nuclear fuel assurances for countries that forego national fuel cycle facilities, but fears of cartelization as well as states’ natural desire to control their energy destiny have made proposals such as those of Acheson-Lilienthal, INFA in the NNPA, and the more recent ones from ElBaradei and NTI\*even with President Obama’s endorsement\*difficult to implement and perhaps ineffective if implemented. Thus, NPT Article IV remains a problem and a vehicle for raising the risk of proliferation as long as it is cast as giving the right of full access to nuclear technologies to NPT state parties. That is not to say that nuclear fuel assurances cannot be successful under certain special conditions and circumstances. But the acceptability of these conditions is problematic for any country sensitive to its sovereignty or for any potential proliferators. Any system creating tiers of limited suppliers and recipients is likely to engender complaints of discrimination and a class system for recipients that will be resented.

#### Obama already pushing and failing

Daniel Horner and Oliver Meier 9, Arms Control Today, “Talks on Fuel Bank Stalled at IAEA”, October, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/fuelBank>

Plans to establish an international nuclear fuel bank, a key part of nonproliferation programs put forward by several world leaders, have failed to receive the support they need to start being put in place. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors ended its September meeting with little progress since June, the last time the board met. Earlier this year, advocates of the proposed fuel bank had talked about a timetable under which the board in June would have directed the IAEA Secretariat to flesh out a proposal for the September meeting and the board could have then endorsed it. But at the June meeting, some of the board’s 35 members balked at the plans. The board essentially decided to continue discussing the plan at a conceptual level. The talks have not made much headway since then, sources at the September meeting said. IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei, President Barack Obama, and others have strongly backed the fuel bank concept. The aim of the fuel bank proposals is to dissuade countries from pursuing their own uranium-enrichment programs by providing them with an assured supply of fuel at market prices. The bank would serve as backup to existing commercial mechanisms for countries with good nonproliferation credentials. In February 2004, President George W. Bush proposed a version of this approach in a speech at the National Defense University in Washington. (See ACT, March 2004.) But Bush’s version required countries to “renounce” enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing and was combined with a call for a ban on enrichment- and reprocessing-related exports to states that do not already operate fuel cycle facilities. That approach led to complaints from many potential recipients, and U.S. officials eventually turned away from such language. All proposals so far, however, have come from current or potential supplier states, while potential recipients have been largely indifferent or critical. (See ACT, January/February 2009.)

## elections – iran

#### Both candidates have same Iran policy

Aaron David **Miller 12**, scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, “Barack O'Romney”, May 23, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/23/barack\_oromney

It's not only on these core assumptions that the candidates share a broad agreement. These principles translate into specific policies where it would be tough to tell the difference between a Romney and an Obama presidency: Iran: Sorry, I just don't see any significant difference between the way Obama is handling Iran's nuclear program and the way Romney might as president. And that's because there's seems to be an inexorable arc to the Iranian nuclear problem. If by 2013 sanctions and negotiations don't produce a sustainable deal and Iran continues its quest for a nuclear weapon, one of two things is going to happen: Israel is likely to strike, or we will. If it's the former, both Obama and Romney would be there to defend the Israelis and manage the mess that would follow. Both would be prepared to intercede on Israel's behalf if and when it came to that. As for a U.S. strike, it's becoming a bipartisan article of faith that the United States will not permit Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. And both men are prepared to use military strikes against Iran's nuclear sites as a last resort, even if it only means a delay (and that's what it would mean) in Iran's quest for nukes.

#### No strikes – negotiations now

Slavin, 3/23/12

[Barbara, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C, “ Iran, Israel and U.S. moves from war rhetoric back to diplomacy,” <http://womennewsnetwork.net/2012/03/23/iran-israel-us-war-rhetoric/>]

After months of sabre-rattling rhetoric by Iran, Israel and the United States, there seems to be a collective, and welcome, time out. Since President Barack Obama’s 4 March speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), all sides have been stressing non-military means to try to resolve the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program. While asserting that he is determined to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, Obama spent much of his AIPAC address decrying what he called “loose talk” of war. He spoke eloquently of the costs of military conflict for a nation that has fought two wars in the last decade. His message to visiting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was clear: I am not going to start another war and you are not going to drag me into one. Netanyahu, for his part, appeared to bow to several realities. A savvy politician, he is recalculating the odds that Obama will be re-elected for another four-year term. The Israeli leader also knows that most of Israel’s defense and intelligence establishment – as well as a majority of the Israeli people – oppose a unilateral strike on Iran that could spark massive retaliation without significantly setting back the Iranian nuclear program. Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan has called such a strike “stupid”. Obama argues that economic sanctions are having a major impact on the Iranian economy and should be given more time to work. Evidence bears this out. U.S. banking sanctions and the threat of a European oil embargo have reduced the value of Iran’s currency by half, increased inflation and unemployment and depressed oil production. The International Energy Agency reported last week that Iran is pumping only 3.3 million barrels a day – down from 3.8 million barrels last year – and Iran’s oil exports may drop by as much as 50 per cent this summer. While denying that sanctions are a factor, Iranian leaders have agreed to come back to negotiations with the so-called P5+1 – the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. Talks – the first since January 2011 – are expected to take place after the Iranian New Year holiday. In advance, the Islamic Republic has been conducting a charm offensive. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on 8 March reaffirmed a 1995 fatwa that building nuclear weapons would be a “great sin”. He also praised Obama for criticising war talk. “Such remarks are good and indicate a step out of delusions”, Khamenei said. On 15 March, Mohammad Javad Larijani, a U.S.-educated physicist and adviser to Khamenei, told CNN’s Christiane Amanpour that Iran would provide “full transparency” for its nuclear program in return for acceptance of Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Larijani also denied that Iran had any intention of attacking Israel, saying that Iran would defend itself against aggression but would not strike another country first. The Iranians have signaled their interest in dialogue with the United States in other ways. On 5 March, Iran’s Supreme Court ordered a retrial for an Iranian American former U.S. Marine who had been sentenced to death as a CIA spy. On 13 March, the U.S. deported back to Iran an Iranian arms dealer arrested in 2007 in a sting operation in the Republic of Georgia. Taken together, these steps improve the atmosphere for negotiations. However, it remains unclear whether the Obama administration and its partners will put forward proposals that could provide Iran a face-saving way to reduce tensions.

## elections

No comebacks in the last fifteen presidential elections

Klein, 9-17

Ezra Klein, author of the Washington Post’s Wonk Blog, “The Romney campaign is in trouble,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/09/17/romney-is-behind-and-the-debates-arent-likely-to-save-him/

On the presidential level, where everyone running campaigns is very, very good at their jobs, campaign infighting and incoherence tend to be the result of a candidate being behind in the polls, not the cause of it. Romney is behind and has been there for quite some time. According to the Real Clear Politics average of head-to-head polls, Romney hasn’t led the race since October 2011. The closest he came to a lead in the polls this year was during the Republican National Convention, when he managed to … tie Obama.

Romney is also behind in most election-forecasting models. Political scientist James Campbell rounded up 13 of the most credible efforts to predict the election outcome: Romney trails in eight of them. He’s also behind in Nate Silver’s election model, the Princeton Election Consortium’s meta-analysis, Drew Linzer’s Votamatic model and the Wonkblog election model.

But I didn’t realize quite how dire Romney’s situation was until I began reading “The Timeline of Presidential Elections: How Campaigns Do and Don’t Matter,” a new book from political scientists Robert Erikson and Christopher Wlezien.

What Erikson and Wlezien did is rather remarkable: They collected pretty much every publicly available poll conducted during the last 200 days of the past 15 presidential elections and then ran test after test on the data to see what we could say about the trajectory of presidential elections. Their results make Romney’s situation look very dire.

For instance: The least-stable period of the campaign isn’t early in the year or in the fall. It’s the summer. That’s because the conventions have a real and lasting effect on a campaign.

“The party that gains pre- to post-convention on average improves by 5.2 percentage points as measured from our pre- and post-convention benchmarks,” write Erikson and Wlezien. “On average, the party that gains from before to after the conventions maintains its gain in the final week’s polls. In other words, its poll numbers do not fade but instead stay constant post-conventions to the final week.”

This year, it was the Democrats who made the biggest gains from before to after the conventions. Obama is leading by 3 percent in the Real Clear Politics average of polls, about double his lead before the Republican convention. If that doesn’t fade by the end of the week or so — that is, if it proves to be a real lead rather than a post-convention bounce — then there’s simply no example in the past 15 elections of a candidate coming back from a post-convention deficit to win the popular vote.

This is about the point where I’m supposed to write: That said, the race remains close, and the debates are coming soon. It’s still anyone’s game.

But the most surprising of Erikson and Wlezien’s results, and the most dispiriting for the Romney campaign, is that unlike the conventions, the debates don’t tend to matter. There’s “a fairly strong degree of continuity from before to after the debates,” they write. That’s true even when the trailing candidate is judged to have “won” the debates. “Voters seem to have little difficulty proclaiming one candidate the ‘winner’ of a debate and then voting for the opponent,” Erikson and Wlezien say.

Gallup agrees. The august polling firm reviewed the surveys it did before and after every televised presidential debate and concluded they “reveal few instances in which the debates may have had a substantive impact on election outcomes. “

The Romney campaign tends to point to two elections to show how its candidate could win this thing. There’s 1980, when Jimmy Carter supposedly led Ronald Reagan until the debates, and 1988, when Michael Dukakis was leading by 13 points after his convention. In fact, Reagan led going into the 1980 debates. And although Dukakis’s convention bounce was indeed large, it was wiped out by Bush’s convention bounce, which put him back in the lead.

That’s not to say Romney couldn’t win the election. A 3 percent gap is not insurmountable. But we’re quickly approaching a point where his comeback would be unprecedented in modern presidential history. And if the Romney campaign begins to crack under the pressure, then that comeback becomes that much less likely.

Can’t change the race

Silver, 9-8

Nate Silver, “Sept. 8: Conventions May Put Obama in Front-Runner’s Position,” FiveThirtyEight, http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/08/sept-8-conventions-may-put-obama-in-front-runners-position/

Again, this is just the upside case for Mr. Obama — not the reality yet. But the fact that it seems plausible is a bit surprising to me. Very little has moved the polls much all this year — including Mr. Romney’s convention and his choice of Paul D. Ryan as his running mate, events that typically produce bounces. But Mr. Obama has already made clear gains in the polls in surveys that only partially reflect his convention.

As surprising as it might be, however, I do not see how you can interpret it as anything other than a good sign for Mr. Obama. All elections have turning points. Perhaps Mr. Obama simply has the more persuasive pitch to voters, and the conventions were the first time when this became readily apparent.

Polls conducted after the incmbent party’s convention typically inflate the standing of the incumbent by a couple of points, but not usually by more than that. Otherwise, they have predicted the eventual election outcome reasonably well.

Since 1968, the largest post-convention polling deficit that a challenger overcame to win the race was in 2000, when George W. Bush trailed Al Gore by about four points after the Democratic convention but won the Electoral College — although Mr. Bush lost the popular vote.

In fact, Mr. Romney has never held a lead over Mr. Obama by any substantive margin in the polls. The Real Clear Politics average of polls put Mr. Romney ahead by a fraction of a percentage point at one point in October 2011, and he pulled into an exact tie at one point late in the week of his convention, after it was over, but he has never done better than that.

That makes this an etremely odd election. You would figure that at some point over the past year, Mr. Romney would have pulled into the lead in the polls, given how close it has usually been. John McCain held occasional leads in 2008; John Kerry led for much of the summer in 2004; and Michael Dukakis had moments where he was well ahead of George H.W. Bush in the spring and summer of 1988. But Mr. Romney, if there have been moments when his polls were ever-so-slightly stronger or weaker, has never really had his moment in the sun.

Instead, the cases where one candidate led essentially from wire to wire have been associated with landslides: Bill Clinton in 1996, Ronald Reagan in 1984, Richard Nixon in 1972 and Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956.

There is almost no chance that Mr. Obama will win by those sort of margins. But this nevertheless seems like an inauspicious sign for Mr. Romney. If even at his high-water mark, he can only pull the race into a rough tie, what pitch can he come up with in October or November to suddenly put him over the top?

#### Romney can’t turn this into a win—he’s already come out in support of nuclear

Wood 9/13/12

Elisa, energy columnist for AOL, “What Obama and Romney Don't Say About Energy,” <http://energy.aol.com/2012/09/13/what-obama-and-romney-dont-say-about-energy/>, AM

Fossil fuels and renewable energy have become touchy topics in this election, with challenger Mitt Romney painting President Barack Obama as too hard on the first and too fanciful about the second – and Obama saying Romney is out of touch with energy's future. But two other significant resources, nuclear power and energy efficiency, are evoking scant debate. What gives? Nuclear energy supplies about 20 percent of US electricity, and just 18 months ago dominated the news because of Japan's Fukushima Daiichi disaster – yet neither candidate has said much about it so far on the campaign trail. Romney mentioned nuclear power only seven times in his recently released white paper, while he brought up oil 150 times. Even wind power did better with 10 mentions. He pushes for less regulatory obstruction of new nuclear plants, but says the same about other forms of energy. Obama's campaign website highlights the grants made by his administration to 70 universities for research into nuclear reactor design and safety. But while it is easy to find his ideas on wind, solar, coal, natural gas and oil, it takes a few more clicks to get to nuclear energy. The Nuclear Energy Institute declined to discuss the candidates' positions pre-election. However, NEI's summer newsletter said that both "Obama and Romney support the use of nuclear energy and the development of new reactors."

#### DOD energy programs don’t link---conservative won’t oppose

Davenport 12

Coral Davenport, energy and environment correspondent for National Journal. Prior to joining National Journal in 2010, Davenport covered energy and environment for Politico, and before that, for Congressional Quarterly. In 2010, she was a fellow with the Metcalf Institute for Marine and Environmental Reporting. From 2001 to 2004, Davenport worked in Athens, Greece, as a correspondent for numerous publications, including the Christian Science Monitor and USA Today, covering politics, economics, international relations and terrorism in southeastern Europe. She also covered the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, and was a contributing writer to the Fodor’s, Time Out, Eyewitness and Funseekers’ guidebook series. Davenport started her journalism career at the Daily Hampshire Gazette in Northampton, Massachusetts, after graduating from Smith College with a degree in English literature. National Journal, 2/10/12, White House Budget to Expand Clean-Energy Programs Through Pentagon, ProQuest

The White House believes it has figured out how to get more money for clean-energy programs touted by President Obama without having it become political roadkill in the wake of the Solyndra controversy: **Put it in the Pentagon**. While details are thin on the ground, lawmakers who work on both energy- and defense-spending policy believe the fiscal 2013 budget request to be delivered to Congress on Monday probably won't include big increases for wind and solar power through the Energy Department, a major target for Republicans since solar-panel maker Solyndra defaulted last year on a $535 million loan guarantee. But they do expect to see increases in spending on alternative energy in the Defense Department, such as programs to replace traditional jet fuel with biofuels, supply troops on the front lines with solar-powered electronic equipment, build hybrid-engine tanks and aircraft carriers, and increase renewable-energy use on military bases. While Republicans will instantly shoot down requests for fresh spending on Energy Department programs that could be likened to the one that funded Solyndra, many support alternative-energy programs for the military. "I do expect to see the spending," said Rep. Jack Kingston, R-Ga., a member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, when asked about increased investment in alternative-energy programs at the Pentagon. "I think in the past three to five years this has been going on, but that it has grown as a culture and a practice - and it's a good thing." "If Israel attacks Iran, and we have to go to war - and the Straits of Hormuz are closed for a week or a month and the price of fuel is going to be high," Kingston said, "the question is, in the military, what do you replace it with? It's not something you just do for the ozone. It's strategic." Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., who sits on both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, said, "I don't see what they're doing in DOD as being Solyndra." "We're not talking about putting $500 million into a goofy idea," Graham told National Journal . "We're talking about taking applications of technologies that work and expanding them. I wouldn't be for DOD having a bunch of money to play around with renewable technologies that have no hope. But from what I understand, there are renewables out there that already work." A senior House Democrat noted that this wouldn't be the first time that the **Pentagon has been utilized to advance policies that wouldn't otherwise be supported**. "They did it in the '90s with medical research," said Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., ranking member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. In 1993, when funding was frozen for breast-cancer research programs in the National Institutes of Health, Congress boosted the Pentagon's budget for breast-cancer research - to more than double that of the health agency's funding in that area. **Politically, the strategy makes sense**. Republicans are ready to fire at the first sign of any pet Obama program, and renewable programs at the Energy Department are an exceptionally ripe target. That's because of Solyndra, but also because, in the last two years, the Energy Department received a massive $40 billion infusion in funding for clean-energy programs from the stimulus law, a signature Obama policy. When that money runs out this year, a request for more on top of it would be met with flat-out derision from most congressional Republicans. Increasing renewable-energy initiatives at the Pentagon can also help Obama advance his broader, national goals for transitioning the U.S. economy from fossil fuels to alternative sources. As the largest industrial consumer of energy in the world, the U.S. military can have a significant impact on energy markets - if it demands significant amounts of energy from alternative sources, it could help scale up production and ramp down prices for clean energy on the commercial market. Obama acknowledged those impacts in a speech last month at the Buckley Air Force Base in Colorado. "The Navy is going to purchase enough clean-energy capacity to power a quarter of a million homes a year. And it won't cost taxpayers a dime," Obama said. "What does it mean? It means that the world's largest consumer of energy - the Department of Defense - is making one of the largest commitments to clean energy in history," the president added. "That will grow this market, it will strengthen our energy security." Experts also hope that Pentagon engagement in clean-energy technology could help yield breakthroughs with commercial applications. Kingston acknowledged that the upfront costs for alternative fuels are higher than for conventional oil and gasoline. For example, the Air Force has pursued contracts to purchase biofuels made from algae and camelina, a grass-like plant, but those fuels can cost up to $150 a barrel, compared to oil, which is lately going for around $100 a barrel. Fuel-efficient hybrid tanks can cost $1 million more than conventional tanks - although in the long run they can help lessen the military's oil dependence, Kingston said Republicans recognize that the up-front cost can yield a payoff later. "It wouldn't be dead on arrival. But we'd need to see a two- to three-year payoff on the investment," Kingston said. Military officials - particularly Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, who has made alternative energy a cornerstone of his tenure - have been telling Congress for years that the military's dependence on fossil fuels puts the troops - and the nation's security - at risk. Mabus has focused on meeting an ambitious mandate from a 2007 law to supply 25 percent of the military's electricity from renewable power sources by 2025. (Obama has tried and failed to pass a similar national mandate.) Last June, the DOD rolled out its first department-wide energy policy to coalesce alternative and energy-efficient initiatives across the military services. In January, the department announced that a study of military installations in the western United States found four California desert bases suitable to produce enough solar energy - 7,000 megawatts - to match seven nuclear power plants. And so far, those **moves have met with approval from congressional Republicans**. Even so, any request for new Pentagon spending will be met with greater scrutiny this year. The Pentagon's budget is already under a microscope, due to $500 billion in automatic cuts to defense spending slated to take effect in 2013. But even with those challenges, clean-energy spending probably won't stand out as much in the military budget as it would in the Energy Department budget. Despite its name, the Energy Department has traditionally had little to do with energy policy - its chief portfolio is maintaining the nation's nuclear weapons arsenal. Without the stimulus money, last year only $1.9 billion of Energy's $32 billion budget went to clean-energy programs. A spending increase of just $1 billion would make a big difference in the agency's bottom line. But it would probably be easier to tuck another $1 billion or $2 billion on clean-energy spending into the Pentagon's $518 billion budget. Last year, the Pentagon spent about $1 billion on renewable energy and energy-efficiency programs across its departments.

#### The public loves reactors

Christine Todd **Whitman 12**, CASEnergy Co-Chair, Former EPA Administrator and New Jersey Governor, “Nuclear Power Garners Bipartisan Support”, August 13, <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php?rss=1&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+njgroup-energy+%28Energy+%26+Environment+Experts--Q+with+Answer+Previews%29#2237728>

The energy policy that I’ve seen garner consistent support from the left and the right over the years is also one with which I’m deeply familiar. This policy involves building a diverse portfolio of low-carbon energy sources, featuring a renewed investment in nuclear energy. And it’s not just policymakers from both sides of the aisle who support nuclear energy – it’s everyday energy consumers as well. According to a Gallup poll conducted in March of this year, nearly 60 percent of Americans support the use of nuclear energy to meet our nation’s electricity needs, and a majority support expanding America’s use of nuclear power. Next-generation nuclear energy projects are underway in Georgia, South Carolina and Tennessee, thanks in part to steady popular support, as well as support from President Obama, bipartisan congressional leaders and other policymakers at the federal and state levels. An additional 10 combined construction and operating licenses for 16 plants are under review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This support is founded in the fact that nuclear energy, safely managed, provides an efficient, reliable source of energy. In fact, nuclear power is the only baseload source of carbon-free electricity. It provides nearly two-thirds of the nation’s low-carbon electricity, and will continue to be an important source of energy well into the future given the advent of innovative large and small reactor designs. The use of nuclear energy prevents more than 613 million metric tons of carbon dioxide every year – as much CO2 as is emitted by every passenger car in America. Bipartisan support for nuclear energy also stems from the boost that it provides to local job markets and to local and state economies. As nuclear energy expands and as more than half of the industry workforce approaches retirement, the industry offers growing opportunities for well-paying careers. The industry already supports more than 100,000 jobs, and the combination of retirements and the construction of new facilities could create as many as 25,000 new jobs in the near term. What’s more, the construction of a nuclear facility spurs the creation of other local jobs in industries ranging from manufacturing to hospitality. The industry generates between $40 and $50 billion in revenue and electricity sales, or some $470 million in total economic output and $40 million in labor wages at each U.S. facility every year. That’s a powerful economic engine and a positive impact that leaders are embracing. As America refocuses on cleaner energy policies that help boost our economy, nuclear power is becoming a clear and critical part of a secure, sustainable energy portfolio. We need electricity and we want clean air; with nuclear energy we can have both. It’s a source of power that leaders on both sides of the aisle can support.

## method focus bad

#### Method focus causes scholarly paralysis

**Jackson**, associate professor of IR – School of International Service @ American University, **‘11**

(Patrick Thadeus, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, p. 57-59)

Perhaps the greatest irony of this instrumental, decontextualized importation of “falsification” and its critics into IR is the way that an entire line of thought that privileged disconfirmation and refutation—no matter how complicated that disconfirmation and refutation was in practice—has been transformed into a license to **worry endlessly about foundational assumptions.** At the very beginning of the effort to bring terms such as “paradigm” to bear on the study of politics, Albert O. **Hirschman** (1970b, 338) **noted this very danger**, suggesting that without “a little more ‘reverence for life’ and a little less straightjacketing of the future,” the **focus on** producing internally **consistent** packages of **assumptions instead of** actually examining **complex empirical situations would result in scholarly paralysis.** Here as elsewhere, Hirschman appears to have been quite prescient, inasmuch as the major effect of paradigm and research programme language in IR seems to have been a series of debates and discussions about whether the fundamentals of a given school of thought were sufficiently “scientific” in their construction. Thus **we have debates about how to evaluate scientific progress**, and attempts to propose one or another set of research design principles **as uniquely scientific**, and inventive, “reconstructions” of IR schools, such as Patrick James’ “elaborated structural realism,” supposedly for the purpose of placing them on a **firmer scientific footing** by making sure that they have all of the required elements of a basically Lakatosian19 model of science (James 2002, 67, 98–103).

The bet with all of this scholarly activity seems to be that if we can just get the fundamentals right, then scientific progress will inevitably ensue . . . even though this is the precise opposite of what Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos argued! In fact, all of this obsessive interest in foundations and starting-points is, in form if not in content, a lot closer to logical positivism than it is to the concerns of the falsificationist philosophers, despite the prominence of language about “hypothesis testing” and the concern to formulate testable hypotheses among IR scholars engaged in these endeavors. That, above all, is why I have labeled this methodology of scholarship neopositivist. While it takes much of its self justification as a science from criticisms of logical positivism, in overall sensibility it still operates in a visibly positivist way, attempting to construct knowledge from the ground up by getting its foundations in logical order before concentrating on how claims encounter the world in terms of their theoretical implications. This is by no means to say that neopositivism is not interested in hypothesis testing; on the contrary, neopositivists are extremely concerned with testing hypotheses, but **only after the fundamentals have been** soundly **established.** Certainty, not conjectural provisionality, seems to be the goal—a goal that, ironically, Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos would all reject.

## threat con

#### No impact – threat construction isn’t sufficient to cause wars

**Kaufman**, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, **‘9**

(Stuart J, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” *Security Studies* 18:3, 400 – 434)

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs **only if these factors are harnessed.** Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. **A virtue of** this **symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why** ethnic **peace is more common than ethnonationalist war.** Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

## structural violence

#### War turns structural violence

Bulloch 8

Millennium - Journal of International Studies *May 2008 vol. 36 no. 3 575-595*

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But the idea that poverty and peace are directly related presupposes that wealth inequalities are – in and of themselves – unjust, and that the solution to the problem of war is to alleviate the injustice that inspires conflict, namely poverty. However, it also suggests that poverty is a legitimate inspiration for violence, otherwise there would be no reason to alleviate it in the interests of peace. It has become such a commonplace to suggest that poverty and conflict are linked that it rarely suffers any examination. To suggest that war causes poverty is to utter an obvious truth, but to suggest the opposite is – on reflection – quite hard to believe. War is an expensive business in the twenty-first century, even asymmetrically. And just to examine Bangladesh for a moment is enough at least to raise the question concerning the actual connection between peace and poverty. The government of Bangladesh is a threat only to itself, and despite 30 years of the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh remains in a state of incipient civil strife. So although Muhammad Yunus should be applauded for his work in demonstrating the efficacy of micro-credit strategies in a context of development, it is not at all clear that this has anything to do with resolving the social and political crisis in Bangladesh, nor is it clear that this has anything to do with resolving the problem of peace and war in our times. It does speak to the Western liberal mindset – as Geir Lundestad acknowledges – but then perhaps this exposes the extent to which the Peace Prize itself has simply become an award that reflects a degree of Western liberal wish-fulfilment. It is perhaps comforting to believe that poverty causes violence, as it serves to endorse a particular kind of concern for the developing world that in turn regards all problems as fundamentally economic rather than deeply – and potentially radically – political.

#### Their conception of violence is reductive and can’t be solved

Boulding 77

Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung

Author(s): Kenneth E. BouldingReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1977), pp. 75-86Published

Kenneth Ewart Boulding (January 18, 1910 – March 18, 1993) was an economist, educator, peace activist, poet, religious mystic, devoted Quaker, systems scientist, and interdisciplinary philosopher.[1][2] He was cofounder of General Systems Theory and founder of numerous ongoing intellectual projects in economics and social science.

He graduated from Oxford University, and was granted United States citizenship in 1948. During the years 1949 to 1967, he was a faculty member of the University of Michigan. In 1967, he joined the faculty of the University of Colorado at Boulder, where he remained until his retirement.

Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of 'structural violence' 'and 'positive peace'. They are metaphors rather than models, and for that very reason are suspect. Metaphors always imply models and metaphors have much more persuasive power than models do, for models tend to be the preserve of the specialist. But when a metaphor implies a bad model it can be very dangerous, for it is both persuasive and wrong. The metaphor of structural violence I would argue falls right into this category. The metaphor is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low expectations of life, a condition in which more than half the human race lives, is 'like' a thug beating up the victim and 'taking his money away from him in the street, or it is 'like' a conqueror stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. While there is some truth in the metaphor, in the modern world at least there is not very much. Violence, whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of the armed forces, is a very different phenomenon from poverty. The processes which create and sustain poverty are not at all like the processes which create and sustain violence, although like everything else in 'the world, everything is somewhat related to everything else. There is a very real problem of the structures which lead to violence, but unfortunately Galitung's metaphor of structural violence as he has used it has diverted attention from this problem. Violence in the behavioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them worse off, is a 'threshold' phenomenon, rather like the boiling over of a pot. The temperature under a pot can rise for a long time without its boiling over, but at some 'threshold boiling over will take place. The study of the structures which underlie violence are a very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of social science in general. Threshold phenomena like violence are difficult to study because they represent 'breaks' in the systenm rather than uniformities. Violence, whether between persons or organizations, occurs when the 'strain' on a system is too great for its 'strength'. The metaphor here is that violence is like what happens when we break a piece of chalk. Strength and strain, however, especially in social systems, are so interwoven historically that it is very difficult to separate them. The diminution of violence involves two possible strategies, or a mixture of the two; one is Ithe increase in the strength of the system, 'the other is the diminution of the strain. The strength of systems involves habit, culture, taboos, and sanctions, all these 'things which enable a system to stand lincreasing strain without breaking down into violence. The strains on the system 'are largely dynamic in character, such as arms races, mutually stimulated hostility, changes in relative economic position or political power, which are often hard to identify. Conflicts of interest 'are only part 'of the strain on a system, and not always the most important part. It is very hard for people ito know their interests, and misperceptions of 'interest take place mainly through the dynamic processes, not through the structural ones. It is only perceptions of interest which affect people's behavior, not the 'real' interests, whatever these may be, and the gap between percepti'on and reality can be very large and resistant to change. However, what Galitung calls structural violence (which has been defined 'by one unkind commenltator as anything that Galitung doesn't like) was originally defined as any unnecessarily low expectation of life, on that assumption that anybody who dies before the allotted span has been killed, however unintentionally and unknowingly, by somebody else. The concept has been expanded to include all 'the problems of poverty, destitution, deprivation, and misery. These are enormously real and are a very high priority for research and action, but they belong to systems which are only peripherally related to 'the structures whi'ch produce violence. This is not rto say that the cultures of violence and the cultures of poverty are not sometimes related, though not all poverty cultures are cultures of violence, and certainly not all cultures of violence are poverty cultures. But the dynamics lof poverty and the success or failure to rise out of it are of a complexity far beyond anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer. While the metaphor of structural violence performed a service in calling attention to a problem, it may have d'one a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer.

## 2ac hegemony

#### Best studies validate hegemonic stability theory–it is the proximate cause of peace

Owen ‘11

John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 [www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that **violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits** and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to **violent conflict among and within countries**, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization **is** caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon. The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the spread of democracy. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

## nuclear apartheid

#### Prolif impacts outweigh the K and flip ethics

Ford 11

Chris Ford, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. He previously served as U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and General Counsel to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1/10/11, Havea and Have-Nots: "Unfairness in nuclear Weapons possession," www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=658

First, however, let’s provide some context. As I noted above, it is fascinating that in the long history of military technological have/have not dynamics, the international politics of nuclear weaponry has acquired such a strong flavor of moral critique. To my knowledge, after all, one did not see Xiongnu politics emphasizing how darned unfair it was of those nasty Chinese Emperors to monopolize the presumed secrets of China’s bingjia strategic literature. Nor does the unfairness of Byzantine efforts to control the recipe for Greek Fire seem to have become a prevalent trope of Frankish or Persian diplomacy. “Have nots” have surely always coveted powerful tools possessed by the “haves,” or at least wished that the “haves” did not possess them. It seems pretty unusual, however, for non-possessors to articulate such understandable envy and resentment in the moral language of “unfairness,” and to assume that this presumed injustice should motivate the “haves” to change their behavior. This argument seems to be a curiously modern phenomenon.

One might respond that the very specialness of nuclear weapons makes such a position appropriate. After all, while a local monopoly on iron swords may have given the Vikings some advantage in skirmishes with Native Americans in what the Norsemen called Vinland, such technological asymmetry was not strategically decisive. (Indeed, the Vikings seem ultimately to have been pushed out of the New World entirely.) If iron had threatened to offer the Vikings an insuperable advantage, would the Skraelings have been justified in developing a moral language of “have/have not” resentment that demanded either the sharing of iron weaponry or Viking disarmament in the name of achieving a global “iron zero”? I’m skeptical, but for the sake of argument let’s say “maybe.”

The argument that nuclear weapons are “special,” however, is a two-edged sword. Perhaps they are indeed so peculiarly potent and militarily advantageous that their asymmetric possession is sufficiently “unfair” to compel sharing or disarmament. Such an argument, however, sits only awkwardly – to say the least – with the simultaneous claim by many advocates of the “have/have not” critique that nuclear weapons have no real utility in the modern world and can therefore safely be abandoned by their possessors. After all, it is hard to paint nuclear weapons as being strategically decisive and useless at the same time. (If they are indeed useless, the conclusion of “unfairness” hardly sounds very compelling. If they aren’t useless, however, it may be appropriately hard to abolish them.)

More importantly, any argument about the destructively “special” character of nuclear weaponry cuts against the “unfairness critique” in that it is this very specialness that seems to rob the “have/have not” issue of its moral relevance. Unlike iron swords, the bingjia literature, Greek Fire, or essentially all other past military technologies the introduction of which produced global control/acquisition dynamics, **nuclear weapons** have **introduced existential questions about the future of human civilization which utterly swamp the conventional playground morality of unfair “have/have not” competition. No prior technology held the potential to destroy humanity, making nuclear weapons** – with the possible exception of certain techniques of biological weaponry – **a sui generis case to which the conventional “unfairness” critique simply does not very persuasively apply.**

III. Implications

Let me be clear about this. The moral critique of nuclear weapons possession may yet speak to the issue of whether anyone should have them. (This is not the place for a discussion of the feasibility of the remedies proposed by the disarmament community, but let us at least acknowledge the existence of a real moral issue.) But this matter has nothing to do with “unfairness” per se – and to the extent that it purports to, one should give it little credence. If indeed nuclear weapons do menace the survival of humanity, it is essentially irrelevant whether their possession is “unfairly” distributed – and it is certainly no solution to make the global balance of weaponry more “fair” by allowing more countries to have them. (Disarmament advocates hope to address the fairness problem by eliminating nuclear weapons, of course, but this is just icing. Disarmament is almost never articulated as being driven primarily by fairness; the critical part of that argument is instead consequentialist, stressing the dangers that any nuclear weapons are said to present.) As a moral critique, in other words, the fair/unfair dichotomy fails to speak intelligibly to the world’s nuclear dilemma. It isn’t really about “fairness” at all.

Given the entanglement of nuclear weapons issues with quasi-existential questions potentially affecting the survival of millions or perhaps even billions of people, moreover, **it stands to reason that an “unfair” outcome that nonetheless staves off such horrors is a perfectly good solution**. On this scale, one might say, **non-catastrophe entirely trumps accusations of “unfairness.” Questions of stability are far more important than issues of asymmetric distribution**.

This, of course, has powerful implications for nonproliferation policy, because pointing out the hollowness of the “unfairness” argument as applied to nuclear weapons suggests the moral sustainability of nonproliferation even if complete nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved and the world continues to be characterized by inequalities in weapons possession. **We forget this at our collective peril**.

Don’t get me wrong. “Unfairness” arguments will presumably continue to have a political impact upon the diplomacy of nuclear nonproliferation, either as a consequence of genuine resentment or as a cynical rationalization for the destabilizing pursuit of dangerous capabilities. (Indeed, one might even go so far as to suspect that the emergence of the “unfairness” critique in modern diplomatic discourse is in some sense partly the result of how morally compelling nonproliferation is, in this context, irrespective of the “fairness” of “have/have not” outcomes. Precisely because **the moral case for nonproliferation-driven inequality is** so **obvious and** so **compelling** if such imbalance serves the interests of strategic stability, perhaps it was necessary to develop a new rationale of “fairness” to help make proliferation aspirations seem more legitimate. Skraelings, one imagines, did not need an elaborate philosophy of “fairness” in order to justify trying to steal iron weapons; the desirability of such tools was simply obvious, and any effort to obtain them unsurprising and not in itself condemnable.) But even in this democratic and egalitarian age, merely to incant the mantra of “unfairness” – or to inveigh against the existence of “haves” when there also exist “have nots” – is not the same thing as having a compelling moral argument. Indeed, I would submit that **we lose our moral bearings if we allow “unfairness” arguments to distract us from what is really important here: substantive outcomes in the global security environment**.

“Unfairness,” in other words, is an overrated critique, and “fairness” is an overrated destination. At least where nuclear weapons are concerned, there are more important considerations in play. Let us not forget this.

Perm solves the K best:

#### Prolif exacerbates inequality—turns the K

Biswas 1

Shampa Biswas, Whitman College Politics Professor, December 2001, “Nuclear apartheid" as political position: race as a postcolonial resource?, Alternatives 26.4

At one level, as Partha Chatterjee has pointed out, the concept of apartheid relates to a discourse about "democracy." (49) To use apartheid to designate the unequal distribution of nuclear resources then is also simultaneously to draw attention to the undemocratic character of international relations--or, more literally, the exclusion of a group of people from some kind of legitimate and just entitlement. More specifically, to talk in terms of nuclear haves and have-nots is to talk in terms of a concept of democratic justice based on the "possession" (or lack thereof) of something. "Apartheid," as Sumit Sarkar points out, "implies as its valorised Other a notion of equal rights." (50) **But that this something is "nuclear weapons" complicates the issue a great deal.** If the vision of democracy that is implicit in the concept of nuclear apartheid implies a world of "equal possession" of nuclear weapons, a position implied in the Indian decision to test, **that is a frightening thought indeed**. Yet surely even India does not subscribe to that vision of democracy. "Would India," asks Sarkar, "welcome a nuclearised Nepal or Bangladesh?" (51) If Jaswant Singh is serious that "the country"s national security in a world of nuclear proliferation lies either in global disarmament or in exercise of the principle of equal and legitimate security for all," (52) then it should indeed support the "equal and legitimate" nuclearization of its neighbors, which is extremely unlikely given its own demonstrated hegemonic aspirations in the South Asian region. (53) Further, if India does indeed now sign the NPT and the CTBT, and sign them in the garb of a nuclear power as it wants to do, what does that say about its commitment to nuclear democracy? Even if India and Pakistan were to be included in the treaties as NWSs, **all that would do is expand the size of the categories, not delegitimize** the **unequal privileges** and burdens **written into the categories themselves**.

Indian military scientists claim that India has now accumulated enough data for reliable future weaponization without explosive testing, and Indian leaders have, since the tests, indicated more willingness to sign the CTBT. India has already voluntarily accepted restraints on the exports of nuclear-related materials, as required by the NPT. According to an Indian strategic analyst with respect to negotiation of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, the next major arms-control treaty to be discussed in the Conference on Disarmament, "The key question in relation to the FMCT is not if it is global and nondiscriminatory. It is whether India has sufficient nuclear material at hand to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent." (54) If all India ever wanted was to move from the side of the discriminated to the side of the discriminators, so much for speaking for democratic ideals through the symbol of nuclear apartheid. (55)

There are several troublesome issues here with respect to the concept of "nuclear democracy." On the one hand, it seems clear that **the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons sits ill at ease with any notion of democratic entitlement.** It seems that **rather than equalizing the possession of nuclear weapons, it would be equalizing the dispossession of nuclear weapons that entails a more compelling democratic logic.** (56) On the other hand, there is also the question of the fundamentally undemocratic nature of nuclear weapons themselves. At one level, the sheer scope of such weapons to kill and destroy indiscriminately (a democratic logic here?) renders any laws of 'just war" moot. As Braful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik point out, the very use of nuclear weapons would be to break the principle of proportionate use of force, and such weapons clearly cannot be made to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants as required in the just conduct of war. (57)

In this context, it might be worth pointing to the 1996 ruling by the International Court of Justice at the Hague that stipulated that the "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict and, in particular, the principles and rules of humanitarian law." (58) If the regulation of war can be considered a democratic exercise, then nuclear weapons by their very nature make that exercise futile. At another level is the secrecy that has historically and perhaps necessarily accompanied the development of nuclear-weapons programs, relegated to an aspect of the national-security state that is immunized from democratic scrutiny. Chatterjee argues that nuclear weapons involve a technology that is intrinsically undemocratic -- both domestically and internationally -- since the enormous destructive potential that they embody requires a great deal of secrecy and inaccessibility. (59) Itty Abraham's excellent analysis shows how the intertwined emergence of the independent Indian state and the atomic-energy establishment legally foreclosed the democratic and institutional oversight of the entire atomic-energy enterprise because of its proximity to national security. In other words, the state sponsorship and control of nuclear science, and indeed its constitution in and through nuclear science, makes both science and the state susceptible to undemocratic governance. (60)

#### Turns orientalism

Biswas 1

Shampa Biswas, Whitman College Politics Professor, December 2001, “Nuclear apartheid" as political position: race as a postcolonial resource?, Alternatives 26.4

Where does that leave us with the question of "nuclear apartheid"? As persuasive as the nuclear-apartheid argument may be at pointing to one set of global exclusions, **its complicity in the production of boundaries tha**t help **sustain** a whole other set of **exclusions** also **makes it suspect**. It is precisely the resonances of the concept of apartheid, and the strong visceral response it generates, that gives it the ability to bound and erase much more effectively. In one bold move, the nuclear-apartheid argument announces the place of nuclear weaponry as the arbiter of global power and status, and how its inaccessibility or unavailability to a racialized Third World relegates it forever to the dustheap of history. It thus makes it possible for "Indians" to imagine themselves as a "community of resistance." However, **with that same stroke, the nuclear-apartheid position creates and sustains** yet another **racialized hierarchy**, bringing into being an India that is exclusionary and oppressive. And **it is precisely the boldness of this racial signifier that carries with it the ability to erase, mask, and exclude much more effectively**. In the hands of the BJP, the "nuclear apartheid" position becomes dangerous--because the very boldness of this racial signifier makes it possible for the BJP to effect closure on its hegemonic vision of the Hindu/Indian nation. Hence, this article has argued, in taking seriously the racialized exclusions revealed by the use of the "nuclear apartheid" position at the international level, one must simultaneously reveal another set of racialized exclusions effected by the BJP in consolidating its hold on state power. I have argued that comprehending the force and effect of the invocation of "race" through the nuclear-apartheid position means to understand this mutually constitutive co-construction of racialized domestic and international hierarchical orders.

#### Alt will be co-opted to support nationalist and exclusionary politics—India proves

Biswas 1

Shampa Biswas, Whitman College Politics Professor, December 2001, “Nuclear apartheid" as political position: race as a postcolonial resource?, Alternatives 26.4

The enunciation of the nuclear-apartheid argument by Indian political leaders in the name of a discriminated India raises another set of issues. Herein is a question about identity and interests. As argued earlier with respect to the performative aspects of foreign/security policy, to speak in the name of India is also simultaneously to produce India as a coherent and bounded entity. But scripting India in this fashion means erasing the hierarchies, the exclusions, the differences that mark the space called India. Indeed, to imagine this entity called India as a "community" requires not just an act of collective will, but also and always a "will to power." In other words, the question of "whose imagined community?" is rendered coherent and bounded, and what interests are served by that will-to-power cannot be neglected. (61) When Indian leaders use the nuclear-apartheid argument and make the claims to certain democratic entitlements in using that argument, they will into being an India that is in itself neither coherent nor bounded, and hence render invisible the incoherences and contradictions that threaten that body politic. It is here that the question of Hindu nationalism becomes particularly salient because implicit in this production of India is the establishment of a certain hegemonic vision of India (Hindu, male, upper-caste/upper-class) that serves various specific interests. In other words, the success of Hindu nationalism depends on the ability to interpellate Indians as "Hindus," a boundary-making exercise with its own racialized, exclusionary implications. That a significant amount of political labor is expended by the BJP in claiming Hindus as the "natural inhabitants" of India and on drawing the boundaries around the "Hindu self" reveals how unstable and problematic this boundary-making exercise is. I will investigate this process a little more closely. There is an implicit claim in the Hindu nationalist discourse about who "belongs" to India and who is an "outsider." First, this requires establishing Hindus as the "natural" or "original" inhabitants of India through erasing the history of Aryan conquest and settlement in India. There has been a proliferation of literature that attempts to rewrite this history by demonstrating the indigenous roots of Hinduism. Hindu militant organizations, like the RSS, have been working among the tribal and hills people in India and attempting to bring them into the fold of Hinduism. The labeling of such groups as vanvasis (forest dwellers) rather than adivasis (original dwellers) suggests a conscious attempt to erase the association of Hinduism with "alien" Aryan roots. (62) This is always accompanied by the attempt to project Muslims as "foreigners" (Babar ki aulad, or progeny of Babar), (63) as invaders and conquerors, much like the British (only worse). (64) The second assumption about who belongs to the Hindu community is even more problematic and has had a much longer history of contestation. There have been at least two sources of resistance to the Hindu nationalist definition of the Hindu community. Romila Thapar's work has done much to problematize the very conceptualization of a Hindu religion or a Hindu community. She claims that it was orientalist scholarship that attempted to reconstruct the various parallel systems, practices, and religious beliefs that existed in India (better called Hindu religions, in the plural) into a coherent and rational faith called Hinduism, and this was done from the familiar perspective of Semitic religions. (65) Even more importantly, the construct of the "Hindu community" that Hindu nationalists draw on is a particularistic Brahmanical Hinduism that has been maintained through caste hierarchy. Groups now designated as "untouchables" have sometimes been considered as "outcastes" by upper-caste Hindus, and hence not really Hindus. Many such groups have themselves often resisted being included within a generalized, monolithic Hindu political community. (66) Much of the current BJP support comes from upper-caste, middle-class, urban, northern India, even though the party has attempted with some limited success to broaden considerably its support structure. (67) This upper-caste orientation of the party was to some extent revealed in the reaction to the Mandal Commission's recommendation, when it was charged that this would result in "apartheid, Indian style," dividing the Hindus as a community. (68) Similarly, the politics of the political parties representing lower-caste interests is attributed a "sinister design in undermining the very fabric of Indian society." (69) Hence, the grassroots work conducted by the BJP, RSS, and other affiliated organizations who feel it necessary repeatedly to assert that Dalit groups are "part and parcel of Hindu society." (70) There are also other religious groups who, although they are claimed by Hindu nationalists to be part of the Hindu ambit, have rejected and continue to reject such an incorporation. This includes Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, and various Bhakti sects such as Kabirpanthis and Vallabhacharya, all of whom the BJP considers as offshoots of Hinduism but who have always resisted such inclusion. For instance, the construction and consolidation of a singular, well-defined Sikh identity had itself come from the earlier resistance of the Singh Sabha movement to the assimilationist attempts of the Hindu revivalist Arya Samaj at "purification" and "reconversion" in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. (71) The Sikh demands that led to the Punjab crisis are seen by the BJP as a creation of a pseudosecularist politics in which groups claim a minority status to use the state for its own interests. This attempt to appropriate Sikh identity erases the legitimacy of many of the genuine political demands of Sikhs t hat continue to be ignored. The point is that since the days of Hindu ideologue Savarkar's Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu? there has been an explicit attempt to fix the meaning of Hinduism by appropriating and assimilating within its fold various groups, many of whose self-identities have been staked in opposition to Hinduism. (72) In Savarkar's work there is also an explicit attempt to construct this Hindu nation as a "race." It is quite common to see the category of "race" invoked in the writings of many of the early Hindu nationalists. Many such writers borrowed from Western racial theory to conceptualize religious communities as distinct "races." (73) It is interesting to see that even though important ideologues like Savarkar and Golwalkar attempt to define race at least partially in biological terms, (74) the thrust of the argument is on cultural variables. Hence a Hindu in Savarkar's discourse is one "who has inherited and claims as his own the culture of that race as expressed chiefly in their common classical language Sanskrit and re presented by a common history, a common literature, art and architecture, law and jurisprudence, rites and rituals, ceremonies and sacraments, fairs and festivals." (75) Race, in Golwalkar's writing, is defined as "a hereditary society having common customs, common language, common memories of glory or disaster; in short, it is a population with a common origin under one culture," (76) and it is on this basis that the "Hindu race" is defined. In such an analysis, race and culture are both constituted through the category of religion. (77) It is typical also of the Hindu communal discourse, as Purushottam Agarwal points out, that various ethnic groups owing allegiance to Islam are transformed into one single race, the Muslim. (78) But unlike the category of "the nation," it is very rare to find the category of "race" explicitly invoked in the contemporary Hindu nationalist discourse. Yet even though the BJP does not explicitly invoke the category of race very much (affiliated organizations like the VHP and the RSS still refer to race occasionally), these early formulations inform the BJP construction of Hindu identity and non-Hindu others. Hence, not only are Muslims homogenized into one monolithic community, but also associated with a range of essentialized negative characteristics such as "dirt," "excessive libidinal energies" or "animal sexuality," "backward cultural norms," and so on. Prominent here is the phenomenal procreative power attributed to the racialized community that is a trademark of racial discourse almost everywhere. VHP propaganda stresses both the practice of polygamy and the virility of the Muslim male as contributing to fertility rates that would lead to the Muslim population eventually outnumbering the Hindus. To quote a VHP leader, "Muslims follow a more insidious path to conversion--seduction and then marriage with innocent Hindu girls." (79) A VHP pamphlet states that the Muslim family-planning motto is, "Hum paanch, hamare pacchis" ("We are five"; i.e., one Muslim man and his four wives, and we have twenty-five children). (80) Similarly, Muslim migrants from Bangladesh are attributed with animal sexuality, dirt, and undesirable social behavior, which includes in particular the rape of Hindu women. n other words, to hail Indians as Hindus is also an attempt to appropriate many non-Hindus as Hindus, while simultaneously rejecting Muslims from the Indian nation. This is what makes the definition of the Hindu nation within BJP discourse both problematically broad and dangerously narrow. Hence, if the invocation of "race" through the nuclear-apartheid position by the BJP produces India as a particular kind of nation, one must ask who is racially excluded through this boundary-making exercise, and with what implications. The claim of Hindu nationalists to represent a homogenous Hindu community with pregiven interests in the construction of a Hindu India is a hegemonic project that serves particular caste and class interests. Here the question of India's poverty also becomes more relevant when it is understood that this particular hegemonic vision of (nuclear) India makes possible the redistribution of state resources to a nuclear program that does not have uniform effects across the Indian spectrum. (81) If the threat of economic sanctions was unable to deter Indian and Pakistani nuclearization, one wonders how much of that was a result of the unequal distribution of the burdens of sanctions within a political body and apathy toward the plight of those most adversely affected by such sanctions (i.e., the marginalized groups in society).

## 2ac realism

#### No alternative to interest-based competition in the short term – it stops escalation and lays the groundwork for cooperation

Miller, professor of IR – University of Haifa, ‘10

(Benjamin, “Contrasting Explanations for Peace: Realism vs. Liberalism in Europe and the Middle East,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 31, Iss. 1)

In what follows, I initially differentiate among types of regional security outcomes: hot/cold war and cold/warm peace. The task then is to examine what the different approaches suggest on the avenue to accomplishing peace in general and durable ‘warm’ peace in particular. Following a conceptual discussion of the realist approaches, I apply them to Europe and to the Middle East. In the next section I analyse the liberal conceptions of peace and security and then apply them to the two regions. On the whole, I show that the successful application of all four approaches brought regional peace to Europe – the realist strategies producing initially cold peace and then the liberal ones elevating it to warm peace. In contrast, only the realist strategies were effective in the Middle East, but much later than in Europe, and even then only partially, thus producing at best a fragile and partial cold peace.

In order to bring about peace to the Middle East, first of all the realist mechanisms have to be implemented more forcefully under an intensive hegemonic leadership. This leadership should be able to provide an effective security umbrella to the regional states taking part in the peace process against common revisionist threats. This leadership has then to focus on mediating key regional conflicts, but together with other international players and the regional actors, it should also focus on helping state-building and nation-building processes in the region. Only then the liberal mechanisms can be effective and warm and stabilize the regional peace as was the case in post-1945 Western Europe.

*Hot war* is a situation of actual use of force aimed to destroy the military capabilities of the adversaries. The Middle East is among the most violent-prone regions in the post-WWII international system. Thus, major examples for hot war come from this region including the Arab–Israeli wars (1948–1999, 1956, 1967, 1969–1970, 1973, 1982 and most recently the Second Lebanon War of 2006 and the Cast Lead Operation of 2008–2009), the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) and the Gulf War of 1990–1991.

Cold war is a situation of negative peace[1](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523261003640967#EN0001) – a mere absence of hot war in which hostilities may break out any time. It is characterized by recurrent military crises and a considerable likelihood of escalation to war, either premeditated or inadvertent.[2](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523261003640967#EN0002) The parties may succeed in managing the crises, avoiding escalation to wars while protecting their vital interests,[3](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523261003640967#EN0003) but they do not attempt seriously to resolve the fundamental issues in dispute between them. As to means employed by the parties, a cold war is characterized by the use of military forces for show-of-force purposes such as influencing the intentions of the regional rivals through deterrence and compellence.[4](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523261003640967#EN0004) Diplomacy plays an important role in the parties' relations, but it is largely a diplomacy of violence – the use of military means for diplomatic ends – for signaling, crisis management, and to clarify interests, commitments, and ‘red lines’. An important component of cold war situations is the diplomacy of regional hot war termination, manifested in the establishment of cease-fires or armistices.[5](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523261003640967#EN0005) The presence of enduring rivalries in the region is a key indicator of a cold war there.[6](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523261003640967#EN0006) Examples include the periods between the hot wars between Israel and its Arab neighbours, namely, 1949–1956, 1957–1967, 1968–1973, etc.

*Cold peace* is a situation characterized by formal agreements among the parties and the maintenance of diplomatic relations among them. The underlying issues of the regional conflict are in the process of being moderated and reduced, but are still far from being resolved. The danger of the use of force is thus unlikely in the near future, but it still looms in the background, and is possible in the longer run if changes in the international or regional environment occur. In one or more of the regional states there are still significant groups hostile to the other states, and thus the possible coming to power of belligerent opposition groups in these states may also lead to renewed hostilities or a return to cold war. The parties still feel threatened by increases in each other's power, and are concerned with relative gains.[7](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523261003640967#EN0007)

Military force is not used in the relations between the parties, not even for signalling and show-of-force purposes. Rather, the focus is on diplomatic means for the purposes of conflict reduction or mitigation,[8](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523261003640967#EN0008) and the parties seriously attempt to moderate the level of the conflict through negotiations and crisis-prevention regimes.[9](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523261003640967#EN0009) These efforts, however, stop short of a full-blown reconciliation among the parties. Foreign relations among the regional parties are conducted almost exclusively through intergovernmental diplomacy, and there are limitations on transnational activity which involves non-governmental players. The parties still develop contingency plans that take into account the possibility of war among them. Such plans include force structure, defence spending, training, type of weapons, fortifications, military doctrine, and war planning.

Examples include the Israeli–Egyptian peace since 1979 and the Israeli–Jordanian peace since 1994. Intergovernmental negotiations succeeded to reach formal peace agreements between them. These peace accords have reduced the level of conflict between Israel and these two Arab neighbours. Especially critical is the peace between Israel and Egypt as the relations between them are the key strategic relations in the Arab–Israeli context. Since they have moved to the cold peace level, the likelihood of the eruption of a major inter-state Arab–Israeli hot war has drastically declined.

#### The alt doesn’t spillover

**Mearsheimer 1**, Poli. Sci. Prof. @ U. Chicago, (John J., *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*)

Great powers cannot commit themselves to the pursuit of a peaceful world order for two reasons. First, states are unlikely to agree on a general formula for bolstering peace. Certainly, international relations scholars have never reached a consensus on what the blueprint should look like. In fact, it seems there are about as many theories on the causes of war and peace as there are scholars studying the subject. But more important, poli­cymakers are unable to agree on how to create a stable world. For exam­ple, at the Paris Peace Conference after World War I, important differences over how to create stability in Europe divided Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George, and Woodrow Wilson.49 In particular, Clemenceau was determined to impose harsher terms on Germany over the Rhineland than was either Lloyd George or Wilson, while Lloyd George stood out as the hard-liner on German reparations. The Treaty of Versailles, not sur­prisingly, did little to promote European stability.

Furthermore, consider American thinking on how to achieve stability in Europe in the early days of the Cold War.50 The key elements for a sta­ble and durable system were in place by the early 1950s. They included the division of Germany, the positioning of American ground forces in Western Europe to deter a Soviet attack, and ensuring that West Germany would not seek to develop nuclear weapons. Officials in the Truman administration, however, disagreed about whether a divided Germany would be a source of peace or war. For example, George Kennan and Paul Nitze, who held important positions in the State Department, believed that a divided Germany would be a source of instability, whereas Secretary of State Dean Acheson disagreed with them. In the 1950s, President Eisenhower sought to end the American commitment to defend Western Europe and to provide West Germany with its own nuclear deterrent. This policy, which was never fully adopted, nevertheless caused significant instability in Europe, as it led directly to the Berlin crises of 1958-59 and 1961."

Second, great powers cannot put aside power considerations and work to promote international peace because they cannot be sure that their efforts will succeed. If their attempt fails, they are likely to pay a steep price for having neglected the balance of power, because if an aggressor appears at the door there will be no answer when they dial 911. That is a risk few states are willing to run. Therefore, prudence dictates that they behave according to realist logic. This line of reasoning accounts for why collective security schemes, which call for states to put aside narrow con­cerns about the balance of power and instead act in accordance with the broader interests of the international community, invariably die at birth.

## electrification

Solves global econ collapse

S. I. Bhuiyan 8, Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission, “Nuclear Power: An Inevitable Option for Sustainable Development of the Developing Nations to meet the Energy Challenges of the 21st Century”, International Symposium on the Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Technology in the GCC Countries, http://library.kau.edu.sa/Files/320/Researches/47384\_18845.pdf

Energy is a vital infrastructure for attaining goals of socioeconomic development of any country. Thus providing safe, reliable energy in economically acceptable ways is an essential political, economic and social requirement. The levels of economic development, human welfare and standards of living depend upon energy services. Disparities in energy availability mirror the economic disparities among developed and developing countries. The richest 20% of the global population had consumed about 55% of the total energy and they are producing and consuming 80% of value of all goods and services. On the other hand, the poorest 20% use only 5% of total energy and dispose only 1% of global economic product [1]. Disparities in consumption of electricity among individual countries and among different social strata are even more pronounced. These large disparities combined with future population growth, economic development, and technological progress are important drivers of future energy demand and supply. World population is expected to double by the middle of 21st century. The substantial social and economic developments need to continue, particularly in the developing countries. It is seen in the recent studies that the demand for energy, especially electricity in developing countries is expected to increase by a factor of 2.5 to 3 fold over the next years and 5 to 7 folds by 2050 as they undergo industrialization, experience increased urbanization and improve the living standards of growing population [2]. The share of developing countries in the global energy demand will increase from about 35% to about 60% in the year 2050, while the combined share of industrialized countries and the Central and Eastern European (EEU) countries in the global demand in the year 2050 is expected to decrease to about 23.5% from 50%. Nonetheless the distinction between developed and developing countries in today’s sense will no longer be appropriate. The major part of global energy demand is met through fossil fuels. But the future scenario of global primary energy supply is difficult to ascertain because of complex issues like economics of energy production, strategy of individual supplier country on resource extraction, international politics on energy, the dynamics of the international energy market on a long-term perspective. In addition, emission of greenhouse gases and significant damaging impacts of fossil fuels uses will have significant influences on the future supply-mix. Selection of technology is the other important dimension of energy development plans. The rapid growth in energy demand is one of vital issues for economic development of the country. The demand for energy and hence the related technologies are expected to grow on a faster track in the developing world. Therefore, the sustainable energy development becomes the concern of developing countries. In order to cope with sustainable development, they have to spend the huge amount of valuable foreign fund to import energy every year. Moreover, the price of these fossil fuels is very much uncertain and the developing countries have suffered several times to barter these fuels. For a fast growing, reliable, economically viable, secured and sustainable energy development, the policy planners, decision makers and development planners should address urgently the issues, strategies and proven technology for mid-term and long-term energy planning by considering indigenous energy resources, existing consumption pattern of energy and environmental issues of energy. Since the nuclear power is being considered as a viable option for sustainable energy in many countries due to a little pollution to the environment, low fuel cost, proven technology and ability to produce a large amount of electricity, it is an option for sustainable energy development of a developing country. In the following sections, the justification of introduction of nuclear energy in the overall energy mix for long-term energy planning in a developing country with limited indigenous resources are explained.

Extinction

Kemp 10

Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

## 1AR

## links

#### US Engagment’s inevitable

KHALILZAD 2002

(Zalmay Khalilzad, David Ochmanek, and Jeremy Shapiro, RAND Project Air Force, “United States Air and Space Power in the 21st Century”)

Realistically, the United States has two options in the near future: unilateral or shared global leadership. Because the United States has economic, cultural, and political ties to almost every region on earth, withdrawal and isolationism are unlikely and would certainly carry greater risks. This policy has few adherents in the United States, except on the radical fringes of the political spectrum. Post–Cold War trends only increase and broaden U.S. global involvement as technology, trade, and capital flows continue to increase the interconnections between nations. As former Secretary of State Henry Stimson commented over 50 years ago, the United States can never again be an island to herself. No private program and no public policy, in any sector of our national life, can now escape from the compelling fact that if it is not framed with reference to the world, it is framed with perfect futility. (Quoted in Leuchtenburg, 1995, Ch. 1.)

#### Status quo solves multilat

**World Outline**, postgraduate student in international affairs at King’s College, **1/24**/2012

[“How valuable is multilateral diplomacy in a post-9/11 world?,” http://worldoutline.wordpress.com/2012/01/24/how-valuable-is-multilateral-diplomacy-in-a-post-911-world/]

At the turn of the last century, 189 world leaders convened at the Millennium Summit and approved the Millennium Declaration which outlined eight specific goals that the United Nations was to achieve by 2015.[4] Yet, just a year later the 9/11 terrorist attacks tilted the world upon its head. The Security Council was rallied into action after the attacks and unanimously backed the United States against the threat which had caused so much devastation.[5] However, a wounded United States became increasingly relentless and unilateral in their ‘War on Terror’; when the Security Council refused to authorise a US attack upon an allegedly nuclear-armed Iraq, the United States, led by George. W. Bush, launched the assault anyway without UN approval.[6] This has been referred to as the ‘crisis of multilateralism’, as the United States undermined the very institution of which it is the biggest financial contributor and the most influential player.[7] If the founding member of the UN was refusing to follow the guidelines of the institution then why should other states follow the rules? This act set a worrying precedent for the rest of the world and, as Kofi Annan asserted, ‘undermined confidence in the possibility of collective responses to our common problems’.[8] Other instances of American unilateralism are Bush’s abstention from the Human Rights Council, his refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol and the US departure from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The United States was losing sight of the benefits that multilateral diplomacy has to offer. However, the arrival of Barack Obama at the Oval Office has **revived multilateral values within US foreign policy**. The Obama administration has realised that it must now engage with the UN and this has marked a ‘**transitional moment in the history of multilateralism**’.[9] In his 2010 National Security Strategy, Obama acknowledged the fact that the US had been successful after the Second World War by pursuing their interests within multilateral forums such as the United Nations and not outside of them.[10] The global financial crisis of 2008 and the European Union’s sovereign debt crisis have demonstrated just how interdependent the economies of the western world are and these crises have created an age of austerity in which multilateralism is needed more than ever before.[11] The US has overstretched its resources and is now currently winding down two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; they have realised that they simply do not have the means to conduct their foreign affairs exclusively anymore. **Clear indications of Washington’s improved multilateral engagement with the UN** since Obama’s inauguration, **and the changing attitude in US foreign policy**, are the economic sanctions negotiated over Iran, Obama’s decision for the US to join the Human Rights Council and, more specifically, its participation in the recent Libya mission. In Libya, the US provided support for the mission, yet played a subdued role in the campaign, allowing its European counterparts to take the lead. In contrast to his predecessor, Obama is displaying pragmatism rather than sentimentalism in his search for partners, making alliances in order to adapt to the emerging multipolar world; this is typified by Obama’s recent visit to the Asia-Pacific and his tour of South America (Brazil, Chile and El Salvador) in 2010. For the time being, US unipolarity looks to be a thing of the past; its **foreign policy is changing from Bush’s unilateralism at the start of the century to a more multilateral approach at the beginning of a new decade** under Obama.[12] This is the **correct precedent** that the most powerful nation in the world should be setting for other states to follow. The fact that the US is now engaging with the UN to counter global problems has restored the credibility that the UN had lost after the Iraq debacle and, by setting this example, **other nations will follow suit** and the international community as a whole can only benefit. From this change in US foreign policy, it is clear that multilateral diplomacy is of more value today than it was a decade ago.

## russia

No escalation – disagreements remain limited

Weitz 11 (Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor 9/27/2011, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” <http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties>)

Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States regardless of who is in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage can never be happy with having NATO be Europe's most powerful security institution, since Moscow is not a member and cannot become one. Similarly, the Russians will always object to NATO's missile defense efforts since they can neither match them nor join them in any meaningful way. In the case of Iran, Russian officials genuinely perceive less of a threat from Tehran than do most Americans, and Russia has more to lose from a cessation of economic ties with Iran -- as well as from an Iranian-Western reconciliation. On the other hand, these conflicts can be managed, since they will likely **remain limited and compartmentalized**. Russia and the West **do not have fundamentally conflicting vital interests of the kind countries would go to war over**. And as the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a great pacifier under such conditions. Another novel development is that Russia is much more integrated into the international economy and global society than the Soviet Union was, and Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record. Beyond that, there are objective criteria, such as the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the difficulty of controlling modern means of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia.

## china/india

Malone and Mukherjee, 10

[David M. Malone, a former Canadian Ambassador to the UN and High Commissioner to India, is president of Canada's International Development Research Centre. He is completing a survey of Indian foreign policy called Does the Elephant Dance? (forthcoming in 2011 from Oxford University Press). Rohan Mukherjee is a senior research specialist at Princeton University. He has also worked with the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, and the National Knowledge Commission, Government of India. “India and China: Conflict and Cooperation” Survival, Volume 52, Issue 1 February 2010 , pages 137 – 158]

The Sino-Indian border dispute is long running and fairly intractable, despite shows of flexibility in the past. It periodically prompts both sides to rake up decades-old grievances. Yet India and China have taken meaningful steps towards an institutionalised process for its resolution. Since 1988 they have for the most part managed to separate border issues from the overall bilateral relationship. The long-standing relationship between China and Pakistan presents a further obstacle to closer ties between China and India. However, China has begun to adopt a more even-handed stance, evident during the Kargil War, the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001, and the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. The underlying logic is that Pakistan's growing instability and India's growing power compel China to take a middle path.

China's nuclear and missile-technology assistance to Pakistan is of particular concern to India. Future tensions between India and Pakistan could fuel a nuclear arms race on the subcontinent. In light of the Mumbai attacks and setbacks for the Pakistani government's efforts to contain Islamist influence in the country, however, it would be surprising if Beijing were not becoming somewhat wary of Islamabad, given unrest in its own Xinjiang region and the country's persistent fear of terrorism.30 Moreover, the prospect of nuclear or military conflict between India and China is diminished by the sizeable gap in capabilities between the two.31

Tibet is a significant security concern. Indian parliamentarian and author Arun Shourie argues that 'India's security is inextricably intertwined with the existence and survival of Tibet as a buffer state and to the survival and strengthening of Tibetan culture and religion'.32 For India, the Chinese role in Tibet presents both a threat and a tactical opportunity. The presence of the Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetan refugees in India sometimes allows New Delhi to indirectly apply pressure on Beijing, just as China's policies toward Pakistan sometimes do to India.33 This lever is not often used, however. In 2008, the Indian government took great pains to ensure that Tibetan protestors did not cause any embarrassment to Beijing during the passage of the Olympic Torch through New Delhi.34 On the other hand, at the height of tensions between the two countries over border issues during autumn 2009, a visit by the Dalai Lama to the Buddhist temple community in the disputed Tawang, nestled in northwestern Arunachal Pradesh, can only have been perceived as provocative by Beijing.35

Perhaps the biggest challenge to Sino-Indian rapprochement, and a source of impetus, is the rapidly improving US-Indian relationship. While a much-improved relationship with Washington has helped India counter the traditional pro-Pakistan tilt in US foreign policy, it has also made Sino-Indian rapprochement a greater priority for Beijing.36 This echoes some of the history of Chinese overtures towards India in the 1970s, which were likely made in part with an eye to diminishing Indo-Soviet cooperation. As the global contest for influence between the United States and China intensifies, India is likely to become an important factor in this strategic triangle.

US approaches to China oscillate between policies of containment and engagement. The former has given birth to a new triangle between the United States, India and China, whereby Washington cultivates closer ties with India, as an established democracy and as a regional bulwark against a potentially aggressive, communist China.37 On the other hand, the Obama administration's approach to China has reinvigorated engagement enthusiasts in Washington. Indian commentators have observed with some alarm the renewed cooperation between China and the United States in tackling the global economic crisis, as well as increased US-Chinese interdependence resulting from Chinese creditors holding large amounts of US Treasury Bills and US debtors providing the single largest market for Chinese manufactured goods. This has prompted some to question the logic of picking a side in the unpredictable Sino-US relationship.38

Ultimately, neither China nor India stands to gain from sparking a regional conflict. Both nations are deeply engaged in the domestic sphere, including generating economic reform, maintaining state legitimacy and juggling ethno-nationalism. Even the ostensible machinations of the United States have done little to hamper the current upswing in Sino-Indian relations. In some key international forums, including those addressing climate change, trade, labour laws, arms control and human rights, China and India have found common ground in countering Western positions, though their tactical alliances have often proved unstable in the heat of negotiation.

## us-china

#### No escalation – US wins decisively

AP, 3/9/’11

(“China challenges U.S. edge in Asia-Pacific”)

The U.S. Pacific Command has 325,000 personnel, five aircraft-carrier strike groups, 180 ships and nearly 2,000 aircraft. Tens of thousands of forces stay on China's doorstep at long-established bases in South Korea and Japan.

China's defense spending is still dwarfed by the United States. Even if China really invests twice as much in its military as its official $91.5 billion budget, that would still be only about a quarter of U.S. spending. It has no aircraft carriers and lags the United States in defense technology. Some of its most vaunted recent military advances will take years to reach operation.

For example, China test-flew its stealth fighter in January, months earlier than U.S. intelligence expected, but U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates says China will still only have a couple of hundred of these "fifth-generation" jets by 2025. The United States should have 1,500 by then.

## impacts

#### No escalation

Jamieson9/12/’7(US may attack but will Iran fight back? Asia Times, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/II12Ak02.html>)

Even those Americans actively seeking to provoke a war with Iran have had little success in finding or provoking a suitable incident that can be presented to the American people as a good reason to launch an attack on Iran. Despite the seizure of Iranian personnel in Iraq, at Irbil in January and more recently in Baghdad, the Iranians have refrained from any reckless response, although only their people seized in Baghdad have been returned. The capture of British sailors in March by Iranian Revolutionary Guards might have been a suitable flash point. However, Tehran soon released the sailors after squeezing every propaganda advantage from their capture, and Britain specifically asked the United States not to exacerbate the situation. Since the beginning of the year there have been constant US claims of Iranian interference in Iraq and of the Iranians supplying arms to militias and insurgents in that country. However, no clear link has ever been established between the Iranians and any particular attack on US forces. Even if the United States chose to respond to these alleged Iranian hostile acts with "hot pursuit" Special Forces raids into Iran or the bombing of alleged terrorist training camps in that country, this would not precipitate the sort of crisis needed to justify a wholesale assault on Iran's nuclear facilities and its armed forces in the near future.

## uq 1ar

More false game changers

Immigration

Madison, 6-15

Julie, cbs news staff writer, “Will Obama's immigration decision be a game-changer in November?,” http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544\_162-57454201-503544/will-obamas-immigration-decision-be-a-game-changer-in-november/

(CBS News) On the heels of the Obama administration's surprise announcement that it would no longer be pursuing the deportation of many young, undocumented citizens in the U.S., immigration reform advocates applauded the president for taking long-awaited action - and expressed near-certainty that the move would have game-changing consequences with regard to the upcoming presidential election.

Ryan

Avalon, 8-12

John Avlon, cnn contributor, “Paul Ryan will shift the campaign dynamic,” http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/11/opinion/avlon-ryan-shift/index.html

Forget all the talk about the risk-averse Mitt Romney and his policy-free campaign. Romney just embraced a man whose deficit reduction plans are impressively specific -- and controversial. This is what a game-changer looks like post-Sarah Palin.

Embassy attacks

CBC 9-12

CBC News, <http://news.ca.msn.com/top-stories/will-embassy-attacks-be-a-us-election-game-changer->, Will embassy attacks be a U.S. election game changer?

Stuart Rothenberg, editor and publisher of the Rothenberg Political Report, told CBC News that, at least in the short term, the attacks could boost support for U.S. President Barack Obama.

"There’s a rally-around-the-flag effect where people tend to be supportive of the president as our national figurehead," Rothenberg said. "The immediate reaction is, 'Well, I'm going to stick with my president.,"

Rothenberg added that the events give Obama, who does have foreign policy experience, an opportunity to talk about his national security record. As well, the attacks take the focus away from dismal job numbers.

But Rothenberg said Obama could run into trouble if the crisis continues over a period of weeks or months

"If the situation deteriorates, and suddenly there are questions raised about his effectiveness and his toughness, and his success in the international area, then he could have a problem."

The attacks have already sparked a war of words between the two campaigns. Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney, who continues to lag behind Obama in polls about foreign policy, went on the offensive.

He seized on a statement coming from the U.S. Embassy in Cairo on Tuesday night that condemned not the protesters, but the "continuing efforts by misguided individuals to hurt the religious feelings of Muslims."

Romney countered with his own statement, saying it was "disgraceful that the Obama administration's first response was not to condemn attacks on our diplomatic missions, but to sympathize with those who waged the attacks."

Romney: White House sending mixed signals

The White House distanced itself from the U.S Embassy statement, saying it had not approved those comments. But Romney on Wednesday charged that the Obama administration was sending out "mixed signals" and that it was responsible for all comments.

Democrats slammed Romney, accusing him of politicizing the issue. Obama, in an interview with 60 Minutes, said Romney didn't have his facts right, and that he "seems to have a tendency to shoot first and aim later."

Some Republicans also thought Romney had jumped the gun. Columnist and former Reagan speechwriter Peggy Noonan said she didn’t think Romney was doing himself any favours.

"Sometimes when really bad things happen, when hot things happen, cool words or no words is the way to go," she told Fox News.

Many top Republicans, including House Speaker John Boehner, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor and former secretary of state Condoleezza Rice, all expressed condolences to the victims and outrage over the attacks without criticizing the Obama administration.

'Could be game changer'

However, GOP strategist Alex Castellanos praised Romney, telling CNN that "this could be a game changer."

Gaffes

Sides, 9-17

John Sides, Professor at George Washington University, 9-17-2012, “Mitt Romney and that 47%,” http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2012/09/17/mitt-romney-and-that-47/

Whoa, whoa, whoa. Hasn’t the 2012 campaign taught us not to jump the gun with various “gaffes”? (Yes, I will be using scare quotes throughout.) In fact, didn’t the 2008 campaign teach us this too? Here is my old graph with the 2008 Democratic primary polls, noting Obama’s comment about “bitter” voters who “cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their frustrations.”

No movement in the polls after the story broke. Let’s do some from the 2012 general election thus far:

REMOVED CHART

No discernible or certainly consequential movement because of Obama’s two “gaffes.” The only movement after Romney’s comments about the Libya attack is in his favor, thanks largely to the probably inevitable tightening after Obama’s convention bump.

The best case for saying that “gaffes matter” is that actual voters are persuaded to change their minds because of the gaffes. If they don’t, then it’s tough to argue that “gaffes” are really “game-changers.” And, in fact, usually voters don’t change their minds. See, for example, Michael Tesler’s and my analyses of the impact of “the private sector is doing fine.”

The best argument you can make about these gaffes is sort of a woolly counterfactual: “Well, if it hadn’t been for the release of Romney’s video today, Romney would have been able to accomplish X, Y, and Z, which would have helped him win the election.” Like any counterfactual, there is some plausibility—yes, Romney would rather talk about the unemployment rate than these comments.

But like any counterfactual, it’s predicated on assumptions about what the world would have looked like without these comments. And given the tenuousness of any such assumptions, and the (at best) small effects that single events in any presidential general election campaign tend to have, I would stop well short of calling this video “devastating.”

Many a news cycle was built on a “gaffe” with a remarkably short shelf life.

## DOD Shield 1AR

#### Can’t capitalize---plan spun as a pro-troop measure

Merchant, 10

(Political & Environment Columnist-Discovery, 10/21, “How the US Military Could Bring Solar Power to Mass Market,” http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility/how-the-us-military-could-bring-solar-power-to-mass-market.html)

Furthermore, **Congress is infinitely more likely to approve funding for R&D**; and infrastructure **if the projects are military-related**. Which is depressing, but true -- the one thing that **no politician can get caught opposing is the safety of American troops.** In fact, the whole premise of the article is rather depressing, on point though it may be: The only way we may end up getting a competitive clean energy industry is through serious military investment, which is of course, serious government spending. Which **under any other guise would be vehemently opposed by conservatives.**

## Public 1AR

#### Recent polls

King 11

Marcus King, Ph.D., Center for Naval Analyses Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy TeamLaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, March 2011, Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S.Military Installations, www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear Power on Military Installations D0023932 A5.pdf

It is widely believed that the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island Power Plant played a significant role in shaping negative public opinion about nuclear power, and that the incident along with economic conditions, contributed to a standstill in nuclear construction in the United States [8]. However, surveys taken in 2010 show that public opinion toward nuclear power has changed. One survey indicated that public acceptance moved from 49 percent in 1983 to 74 percent today; according to that survey, those who “strongly favor” nuclear energy now outnumber those who are “strongly opposed

” by more than three to one [9]. Another opinion poll indicated that 62 percent of Americans favor nuclear power and that 28 percent strongly favor it [10].

Favorable public perception has contributed to bipartisan congressional interest in building new nuclear capacity. Congress has introduced several bills that provide funding for new nuclear research and incentives for the nuclear industry. The Enabling the Nuclear Renaissance Act (ENRA) under consideration by the Senate contains many of the nuclear provisions found in previously introduced bills. In the area of small reactor technology, the legislation directs the Department of Energy (DOE) to develop a 50 percent cost-sharing program with industry, and it provides government funding at the rate of $100 million per year for 10 years. The bill also calls for the establishment of a program office within DOE to manage community led initiatives to develop “energy parks” on former DOE sites. The energy parks may include nuclear power plants [11].